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Summary
The green credit policy plays a vital role in promoting enterprise upgrading. Using a
thirteen year panel data of listed companies in China (2007 2019), this study
uses the difference in differences (DID) method to examine the effects of the
Green Credit Guidelines in 2012 (GCG2012) on the firm level total factor productivity
(TFP). Our results show that the GCG2012 significantly increases the TFP of companies
in green credit restricted industries. This finding remains robust through employing
the PSM-DID model, alternating the treatment group, changing the sample period,
and controlling the effects of other environmental policies and financial crises. This
effect is more pronounced for private enterprises, companies with worse debt paying
ability, companies in highly competitive industries and companies in regions with
higher financial liberalization. The impact mechanism test indicates that increasing
the green innovation and reducing the agency costs (including green agency costs and
traditional agency costs) are two possible channels to boost firm level TFP. Further
analysis shows that the GCG2012 is effective not only for heavily polluting
industries but also for light polluting industries, and that the GCG2012 can improve
the economic performance of firms in green credit restricted industries. Overall, this
study reveals the micro mechanisms behind the long term impact of the GCG2012
policy on firm level TFP, providing empirical evidence and policy suggestions for
improving
green
credit
policies
and
promoting
green
development.
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1. Introduction
The environmental issues and the resulting consequences have attracted considerable
attention and have been recognized across the globe (The World Bank, 2007; Aghion et al., 2016).
Being the world’s largest carbon emitter with emissions continuing to grow, China is facing
daunting challenge to reduce pollution and achieve sustainable development while growing its
economy (Zhang, 2000, 2017 and 2021). At the 75th UN General Assembly held in September
2020, China committed to capping its carbon emissions before 2030 and achieving carbon
neutrality before 2060. Therefore, it is of great practical significance and urgency to promote
green, circular, and low-carbon development (Zhang, 2021; Zhang et al., 2021b). To that end,
China should use not only “end-of-pipe” treatment measures but also financial instruments, whose
application in environmental governance has received increasing attention in recent years
(Soundarrajan and Vivek, 2016) and helps to optimize resource allocation.
Financial instruments have the dual characteristics of financial resource allocation and
environmental regulation, and are considered indispensable to achieve the goal of ecological
environment governance. There are at least the three reasons. Firstly, the investment in
environmental governance of the enterprise with limited funds must have a significant crowdingout effect on the productive investment in the short term (Duygan-Bump et al., 2015; Liu et al.,
2021). Secondly, long-term financing constraints will inhibit business activity (Wen et al., 2021;
Yao et al., 2021). Enterprises have to carry out technological innovation and green production to
ease financing constraints (Wang and Wang, 2021; Yu et al., 2021). Lastly, financial instruments
prod enterprises to upgrade and switch to the green economy (An et al., 2021). Thus, financial
instruments as exemplified by green finance are an important measure to realize green
development and promote high-quality economic development (Scholtens and Dam, 2007; Zhang
and Wang, 2021). Thus, China has formulated a series of green finance policies, for example, the
Green Credit Guidelines formulated by the China Banking Regulatory Commission in 2012
(CBRC, 2012), the Guidance on Building a Green Financial System issued by the People’s Bank
of China and seven other departments in 2016 (PBC et al., 2016), Pilot Zone for Green Finance
Reform and Innovation set up by the State Council in 2017 (EMSC, 2017). And China becomes
the first country to build a green financial system driven by the central government (Wang et al.,
2
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2021). These green finance policies aim to constrain capital allocation in heavily polluting
industries and direct resources away from backward highly polluting production capacity (An et
al., 2021).
Total factor productivity fully measures the efficiency of industrial upgrading and the growth
of total economic performance (Baier et al., 2006). Moreover, the Chinese economy relies on an
extensive-growth mode with high investment, high energy consumption, and high pollution
(Kadoshin, 2000). Promoting the total factor productivity is a vital way for China to realize higher
quality, more efficient, and more sustainable economic development (Huang et al., 2019). Given
that companies are the main participants in green development and key stakeholders in green
finance, thus, it is of significantly academic and policy relevance to explore the impact of green
finance on the firm-level total factor productivity.
Some studies have investigated the effects of the green finance policy on companies, and the
results could be summarized as two different views (Evangelinos and Nikolaou, 2009; Wen et al.,
2021; Zhang et al., 2021b). Some studies have found that the green finance policy has a
significant inhibitory effect on polluting enterprises (Liu et al., 2017; Luo et al., 2017; Xu and Li,
2020). They suggest that the green finance policy would reduce the capital investment of energyintensive enterprises (Liu et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2020) and firm performance in heavily
polluting industries (Yao et al., 2021). Xu and Li (2020) discover that the green finance policy
could reduce the debt financing maturity and increase the debt financing costs of high-pollution
and high-emissions enterprises. By contrast, other studies have found that the green finance policy
positively affects polluting enterprises (Zhang et al., 2011a; Wang and Wang, 2021). Wang and
Wang (2021) show that the green credit restricted industries have better green innovation
performance, and the agency costs of the green credit restricted industries have been significantly
reduced, while investment efficiency has been considerably improved. Li et al. (2018) confirm
that green loans can promote cleaner production theoretically. Unlike the end-of-pipe measures of
traditional environmental policies, Sun et al. (2019) detect that the green finance policy forces
firms to reduce pollution at source and imposes long-term credit constraints on polluters. To sum
up, the current literature has discussed the impact of green finance policies on enterprises and has
drawn different conclusions. There is still controversy on whether green finance policies can
effectively promote the green development of polluting enterprises (Zhang et al., 2021b).
3
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Moreover, few scholars have discussed the effect and mechanism of the green finance policy on
the firm-level total factor productivity (Wen et al., 2021).
The green credit policy is one of the important green financial policies (Yao et al, 2021;
Zhang et al., 2021b). Green credit is the most important component of green finance (He et al.,
2019), as China’s financial system is dominated by banks. The green credit balance has accounted
for over 90% of all green financing balances (Wang and Wang, 2021). Therefore, the findings of
green credit are representative. The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) formulated
and issued the Green Credit Guidelines in 2012 (hereafter, GCG2012). The CGC2012 has a
directive function for the green credit of financial institutions, and is considered to be the first
normative document about green credit in China (Liu et al., 2019; Wen et al., 2021). The
CGC2012 policy is a landmark that can help us better explore the effects of green credit. The
policy effectiveness of the CGC2012 policy depends on two aspects. First, the CGC2012 policy is
different from the traditional administrative means, and it is implemented by banks rather than
local governments. As profit-making institutions, banks have greater flexibility in the
implementation of the CGC2012. Meanwhile, although the CGC2012 in China is a kind of
economic means (Zhang et al, 2011a), it is not entirely regulated by the market mechanism. And
banks do not receive economic incentives. Thus, banks may not fully implement the CGC2012
policy without efficient financial incentives. In addition, as the government and the society have
paid increasing attention to environmental issues, stricter environmental regulations may have
negative effects on the production and operation of heavily polluting enterprises, thereby reducing
their creditworthiness (Yao et al., 2021). Thus, banks may help companies promote economic
transformation, and tap into the growth potential of the green economy (Aizawa and Yang, 2010).
Second, the effectiveness of the GCG2012 policy depends on how companies will react (Ding,
2019). It is worth noting that increasing the financing constraints of heavy polluters is not the
ultimate goal. On the macro level, the GCG2012 policy aims to achieve the transformation of the
economy toward low-carbon and green growth by guiding resource allocation and eliminating
highly polluting backward production capacity (He et al., 2019). And on the micro level, the real
purpose of the GCG2012 policy is to promote the green development of polluting enterprises,
rather than inhibiting their upgrading. The GCG2012 policy aims to push polluting enterprises
away from projects that cause heavily environmental pollution (Zhang et al, 2011a), and reduce
4

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1368

6

Guo and Zhang: Green credit policy and total factor productivity: Evidence

their negative externalities. Faced with the financing constraints imposed by the GCG2012 policy,
whether polluters will choose to proactively improve their total factor productivity is subject to
specific empirical verification.
Hence this paper aims to investigate the implementation effect of the GCG2012 from an
enterprise’s microcosmic perspective. We use a DID estimation to explore the long-term
relationship between the GCG2012 and the total factor productivity of listed companies in green
credit restricted industries from 2007 to 2019. We find that the GCG2012 significantly increases
the firm-level total factor productivity of the treatment group compared to the control group,
which remains valid in a series of robustness tests. The analysis of the heterogeneity effects of the
GCG2012 illustrates that the GCG2012 has positive effects on companies with worse debt-paying
ability and companies in highly competitive industries. Moreover, the GCG2012 can all increase
the total factor productivity of private enterprises, state-owned enterprises and the companies in
regions with different financial liberalization, but it has a greater influence on private enterprises
and the companies in regions with higher financial liberalization. Furthermore, we discover that
the GCG2012 prods companies in green credit restricted industries to transform and upgrade by
improving green technological innovation and reducing the agency costs, which include both
traditional agency costs and green agency costs. Interestingly, the GCG2012 could not promote
non-green technological innovation and increase R&D expenditure in the treatment group. Most
importantly, the further study shows that the GCG2012 can promote the economic performance of
companies by enhancing their total factor productivity, indicating that the GCG2012 policy
achieves a win-win for both the environment and the economy.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on the topic of green finance and the firmlevel total factor productivity in three aspects. First, we investigate the impact of the green credit
policy on the firm-level total factor productivity in green credit restricted industries, which more
accurately evaluates the long-term effectiveness of the green credit policy. We find that the green
credit policy generates the Porter effect in China, which complements with existing literature
(Zhang et al, 2011a; Wang and Wang, 2021; Yao et al., 2021; Zhang et al, 2021a). Second, this
study enriches the relevant literature on the micro-economic effects of the green credit policy by
providing new evidence from China (Liu et al., 2017; He et al., 2019; Wen et al., 2021; Zhang et
al., 2021b), the world’s second-largest economy that is now contending with economic
5
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transformations. The green credit policy not only prods companies in green credit restricted
industries to enhance their total factor productivity by promoting green technological innovation
and reducing their agency costs, but also increases the economic performance of firms. This study
might provide empirical evidence and policy suggestions for improving green credit policies and
promoting the green development of polluting enterprises. Third, this paper contributes to the
research studying the firm-level total factor productivity. How to boost total factor productivity
has been the concern of many countries across the globe. Our study identifies an important
channel to enhance the total factor productivity of firms, that is, green finance can promote
enterprise upgrading, which complements with the previous literature (Miao and Wang, 2012; Van
Beveren, 2012; Ren et al., 2019; Herzer, 2022).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypothesis.
Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 analyzes the empirical results. Section 5 and
Section 6 examine the effects of changing industry definition criteria and economic efficiency of
the GCG2012, respectively. The conclusions and implications are described in Section 7.

2. Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1. The Green Credit Guidelines in 2012 and total factor productivity
On the macro level, the total factor productivity could promote high-quality economic
development (Baier et al., 2006; Herzer, 2022). And on the micro level, firm-level total factor
productivity can improve their competitiveness, which helps promote green transformation (Ren et
al., 2019).
Few scholars have studied the effect of the green credit policy on the firm-level total factor
productivity (Wen et al., 2021). Essentially, green finance is an extension and innovation of
traditional environmental regulation. Many studies have investigated environmental regulation and
corporate productivity (Viscusi, 1983; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995; Gray and Shadbegian,
2003; Becker, 2011; Rubashkina et al., 2015; Shapiro and Walker, 2018), and the findings are
controversial and inconclusive. Firstly, environmental regulation has negatively effect on
corporate productivity (Viscusi, 1983; Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1990; Gray and Shadbegian,
2003). Environmental regulation would increase the costs and delay investment decisions (Viscusi,
6

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1368

8

Guo and Zhang: Green credit policy and total factor productivity: Evidence

1983), which makes the enterprise uncompetitive in the same industry and puts a negative effect
on the corporate productivity (Gray and Shadbegian, 2003). Barbera and McConnell (1990) find
that command-and-control environmental regulation harms industry-level total factor productivity
when studying the manufacturing industry in the U.S. Lanoie et al. (2008) prove that the extra cost
caused by the strict environmental regulation can reduce total factor productivity. Secondly, some
studies document that environmental regulation has positively effect on productivity (Porter and
Van der Linde, 1995; Hamamoto, 2006; Rubashkina et al., 2015). Environmental regulation
creates extra costs in the short term. However, in the long term, proper environmental regulations
can increase the total factor productivity of companies by triggering innovation offsets (Porter and
Van der Linde, 1995), and ultimately create superior earnings (Alpay et al., 2002). Testa et al.
(2011) demonstrate that more flexible environmental regulations can significantly increase the
research and development investment, thereby increasing firm productivity. Rubashkina et al.
(2015) find that industry-level productivity growth is affected by environmental policies by using
panel data from manufacturing sectors of 17 European countries. Lastly, some scholars believe
that environmental regulation has no statistically significant effect on the total factor productivity,
possibly because the gains from technical innovation offset the higher costs (Becker, 2011;
Shapiro and Walker, 2018). Some hold that the relationship between environmental regulation and
enterprise productivity depends on other factors, like the timing and strength of policy (Lanoie et
al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2011b; Wang and Liu, 2014). It can be seen that the impact of
environmental regulation on the firm-level total factor productivity is unclear. The GCG2012
policy is an “initial-of-pipe” treatment measure and full lifecycle governance tool (Wang and
Wang, 2021), which may be more effective to force enterprises to upgrade than the traditional
environmental regulation.
Additionally, the GCG2012 affects the firm-level total factor productivity in green credit
restricted industries by allocating financial resources. The main reason for credit rationing is the
information asymmetry between banks and enterprises, leading to adverse selection and moral
hazards (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Bank credit is still an important channel of financing for
Chinese enterprises. However, due to the information asymmetry between banks and enterprises
and the problems of financial restraint, the financial resource has been tilted towards state-owned
enterprises and large enterprises. The imbalance in the allocation of financial resources has largely
7
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pushed funds into polluting industries (Liu and Wen, 2019), which has resulted in companies in
these industries having no incentive to improve their total factor productivity. However, after the
GCG2012 was enforced, companies in green credit restricted industries face more severe financial
constraints (CBRC, 2012; Liu et al., 2017; He et al., 2019), leading them to increase total factor
productivity to reduce costs and improve their competitiveness. The GCG2012 policy affects the
productivity of companies in green credit restricted industries by changing capital flow. Therefore,
the hypothesis is provided.
H1. The GCG2012 policy can significantly increase the firm-level total factor productivity in
green credit restricted industries.

2.2. Mechanisms of the GCG2012 to promote total factor productivity
2.2.1 The GCG2012 promotes total factor productivity by enhancing green technological
innovation
According to the Porter effect, formulating reasonable environmental policies has an
“innovative compensation effect” on polluting firms (Porter and van der Linde, 1995), prompting
their technological innovation, especially green innovation (Hamamoto, 2006; Lanoie et al., 2008).
Differing from traditional environmental policy, the GCG2012 mainly uses the financing channel
to make enterprise environmental costs endogenous. Companies in green credit restricted
industries have to pay the costs of the pollution that they emit, and they need to face worse credit
availability and higher loan cost (Liu et al., 2017). Stricter financing constraints of companies in
green credit restricted industries caused by the GCG2012 would inhibit corporate technical
innovation investment (Caggese and Cuñat, 2013). Innovation activities are featured by high
investment, high degree of uncertainty, and long-period (Bansal and Hunter, 2003). Companies in
green credit restricted industries don’t have enough money to increase technological innovation
investment. And they even may divert funds from technical innovation investment to rigidity
expenditures such as maintaining production and operation (Liu et al., 2021), because technical
innovation investment cannot bring benefits to offset the negative impact of the GCG2012 on
economic profit in the short term, but rigid expenditures can. Moreover, the GCG2012 requires
banks to supervise companies to protect the environment (Wang and Wang, 2021). Companies in
green credit restricted industries have to invest more productive factors into emissions reduction
8
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activities, which may have a crowding-out effect on technical innovation investment. Lu et al.
(2021) find that green credit policies inhibit the technological innovation of heavy polluting
enterprises, especially those with high external financing reliance.
Whether a company implements a technology innovation strategy depends on the level of
incentives that it obtains (Borghesi et al., 2015). Faced with stricter environmental regulations,
companies are more inclined to realize green innovation (Aghion et al., 2016). Green credit
policies affect the enterprises’ productivity by changing capital flow, which supports businesses to
carry out cleaner production and encourages financial institutions to develop diversified green
financial products. Green credit policies include a series of “initial-of-pipe” treatment measures
and full lifecycle governance tools (Wang and Wang, 2021), which may be more effective to
promote enterprises to green innovation than traditional environmental regulations. The GCG2012,
one of the most representative green credit policies (Yao et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2021b), has
changed the incentive structure of enterprises for cleaner production and has promoted green
technological innovation.
From the angle of enterprises, green innovation has gradually become an important driving
force for green development (Chen, 2008), helping to promote high-quality economic
development on the macro level. And green innovation has increasingly become an important
driving force for enterprises to improve their market competitiveness, helping to accelerate energy
conservation and emissions reduction and switch to the green economy. In the face of stricter
green credit, only companies pursuing green innovation can mitigate the high environmental costs,
as demonstrated by Goetz (2019) and He et al. (2019) using the enterprise data of America and
China, respectively. From the angle of the GCG2012, it specifies that banks have to strengthen
their support for green innovation of customers who are applying for a loan and cannot approve
loans to customers who are not compliant with their environmental and social performance
standards (CBRC, 2012). In addition, the implementation of the GCG2012 has further clarified the
direction of environmental regulation policies, which would help strengthen the determination of
companies in green credit restricted industries to pursue green development.
Facing the dual challenges of the environmental policy and economic development,
companies in green credit restricted industries do not have enough money to support technical
innovation projects, but they must vigorously promote green innovation with limited technical
9
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innovation investment, which may limit non-green technology innovation (Marin, 2014). Thus,
the GCG2012, as an environmental policy, may has a crowding-out effect on enterprises’ nongreen innovation. The ultimate goal of a firm is to maximize its worth, and the GCG2012 can
influence their total factor productivity by pushing them to green innovation. Based on the above
analysis, we propose the following hypothesis:
H2. Since the GCG2012 was enforced, the technical innovation investment and non-green
technological innovation have not increased, but green technological innovation has increased.
2.2.2 The GCG2012 promotes total factor productivity by reducing agency costs
According to the stakeholder theory, environmental policies can help to ease the conflict
between managers and stakeholders and helps companies to better achieve a green transition
(Kitsikopoulos et al., 2018). Stakeholder pressure can influence a firm’s environmental strategy
proposed by managers (Christmann, 2000). Companies need to gain the support of their
stakeholders and satisfy their interests to achieve sustainable development (Sharma and Henriques,
2005). And managers should consider the interests of the stakeholders in the day-to-day
management of the firms (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Stakeholders have pressed firms to
produce cleaner products (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999), including government, social and
environmental groups, suppliers, shareholders, employees, consumers, etc. Considering that the
GCG2012 influences the cash flow of companies in green credit restricted industries, it mainly
harms the interests of shareholders. In this subsection, we focus on the relationship between
shareholders and managers.
The GCG2012 significantly increases the environmental costs of companies in green credit
restricted industries, which may be even greater than the benefits of blind development (Xu and Li,
2020). Banks have lower costs in obtaining consumers’ personal information and can effectively
supervise corporate managers. Banks play a major role in supervising through differentiated
lending rates that constrain the cash flow of enterprises (Diamond, 1984). Compared with
traditional credit, green credit has stronger supervision (Wang and Wang, 2021). Green credit pays
more attention to environmental protection. Distinguished from the profitability and security of
traditional credit, green credit further requires banking institutions to investigate their customers’
environmental and social risks. The GCG2012 clearly states that banking institutions should take
the environmental and social risks of their customers as one important basis for their credit rating,
10
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credit management and risk control (CBRC, 2012). Moreover, environmental degradation is
increasing and not easy to eliminate. Thus, the supervision of green credit is persistent and
increasingly rigid. Managers have to work harder to seek opportunities for green development to
ease credit constraints and enhance their total factor productivity to improve competitiveness and
profits under the pressure of green credit supervision.
Following Wang and Wang (2021), we can distinguish the agency costs into traditional
agency costs (TAC) and green agency costs (GAC). Green agency costs refer to the conflicting
interests of environmental regulations between shareholders and managers, which can be
understood as the costs caused by minimizing the agency problems of environmental penalties.
Traditional agency costs have persisted since a company was established (Ang et al., 2000). Green
agency costs come into being accompanied by environmental regulations, which present stage
characteristics (Wang and Wang, 2021). Increasing environmental expenditure has positive effects
on economic development and enterprise development at any stage (Zhang et al., 2019b).
However, managers have more autonomy and artificial operation space in environmental
expenditure because of the stage characteristics of green agency costs. Traditional agency costs
have similarities to green agency costs, and thus managers also have more autonomy in
management expenses.
Before the emergence of green credit, traditional environmental regulations usually adopt
end-of-pipe treatment measures (Liu et al., 2021), leading to more environmental costs.
Traditional environmental regulations could not influence the financing constraints of polluting
enterprises, and not act as supervisors for their production processes. And the costs of traditional
environmental regulations may be lower than the benefits of blind development. Managers may
develop blindly for their own performance, which is not conducive to the stable advancement of
the company, ultimately harming the interests of shareholders. Thus, shareholders need to pay
more attention to environmental governance and bear more costs to monitor the environmental
governance decisions of managers. After the emergence of green credit, it changes the capital flow
and sets stricter credit requirements for companies in green credit restricted industries (Liu et al.,
2017; He et al., 2019). And companies in green credit restricted industries are facing great
pressures of reducing emissions and strict credit conditions. Banks act as supervisors for their
11

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

13

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1368 [2022]

production processes. As a result, with the help of the bank’s regulatory function, shareholders
may spend fewer resources monitoring the environmental governance decisions of managers.
If a company with bountiful expenditures on the environment in green credit restricted
industries fails to ease their financing constraints caused by green credit, it may cause
dissatisfaction among major shareholders, small and medium-sized investors, and even the public
(Wang and Wang, 2021). The GCG2012 internalizes this dissatisfaction. This will increase the
cost of managers’ private benefits through environmental protection expenditure, thereby reducing
green agency costs, and it will force managers to manage the business more diligently. Diligent
managers and lower green agency costs can better contribute to the upgrading of the company,
including total factor productivity. Therefore, the GCG2012 can decrease green agency costs and
enhance firm-level total factor productivity. In addition, the GCG2012 could affect traditional
agency costs, which have similarities with green agency costs. Thus, we propose the following
hypothesis:
H3. Since the GCG2012 was enforced, traditional agency costs have decreased, particularly green
agency costs.

2.3. Economic efficiency of the GCG2012
The GCG2012 can influence the cash flow of companies in green credit restricted industries
by increasing credit availability (Liu et al., 2019), thereby reducing their polluting investment and
increasing clean investment, which may eventually change their capital structure. Thus, the
production and management of companies in green credit restricted industries may be greatly
affected, that is, the GCG2012 mainly optimizes resource allocation by changing the cash flow of
enterprises. The GCG2012 aims to promote the sustainable development of companies. According
to the Porter effect, strict and flexible environmental policies not only prod companies to reduce
their emissions, but also enhance their competitiveness and produce excess returns (Porter and van
der Linde, 1995; Petitjean, 2019). Different from command-and-control regulations and marketbased regulations, the GCG2012 plays a significant role in environmental governance by
optimizing capital allocation (Zhang et al., 2021a), indicating that it is more flexible.
On the one hand, the GCG2012 mandates that banks should give priority to investing in
companies that are undergoing a green transformation. Moreover, banks have an ability to monitor
12
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the environmental responsibility of companies (Aintablian et al., 2007). Thus, companies in green
credit restricted industries need to shift toward a green transformation and increase their TFP to
reduce the financing constraints caused by the GCG2012 policy. In this case, companies in green
credit restricted industries that actively pursue green development opportunities can improve the
expectations of institutional investors and get more capital support (Bajo et al., 2016). Institutional
investors can help companies alleviate information asymmetries and provide more accurate
analysis of markets and policies (Cornett et al., 2007), helping to improve their competitiveness
and increase their earnings. Companies in green credit restricted industries need to increase green
innovation investments and promote green production to meet the requirements of the GCG2012
and reduce their credit constraints. As a result, their production process is more environmentally
friendly, and the products are greener. Companies in green credit restricted industries send signals
to the market that they actively transform to the green economy and assume social responsibility.
A good social image attracts more customers (Hu et al., 2021), increasing product sales and
ultimately boosting their profits.
The ultimate goal of enterprises is to maximize profits (Coibion et al., 2018). Enterprises
improve their total factor productivity intending to reduce pollution and save costs, and ultimately
improve competitiveness (Ren et al., 2019). The purpose of the GCG2012 is to help companies in
green credit restricted industries abandon the extensive-growth development and shift to
sustainable development (He et al., 2019). At present, public awareness of environmental
protection has been raised, and energy conservation and emissions reduction are the development
trend. Given the developing trends, companies that actively promote low-carbon and green
transformation can have better development prospects in the future. Wang and Wang (2021) prove
that the GCG2012 can significantly improve corporate economic performance, and Wu et al.
(2021) point out that the total factor productivity of companies has a mediating effect on their
economic performance. Therefore, we have reasons to propose the following hypothesis:
H4. Since the GCG2012 was enforced, the total factor productivity of companies in green credit
restricted industries can increase their economic performance.

13
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3. Research design
3.1. Sample selection and data sources
To better explore the relationship between Guidelines and total factor productivity of
enterprises, the sample companies in our study include Chinese A-share listed companies in heavy
pollution industries from 2007 to 2019. Our study period without 2020 is to avoid the impact of
the COVID-19 on enterprise development. The COVID-19 outbreak has led to the global
economic downturn, which has negatively impacted the firm performance (Shen et al., 2020).
Thus, the production and operation of listed companies have been inevitably affected by the
COVID-19 outbreak since 2020. To mitigate this endogeneity, we decide to end the sample period
in 2019. This study processes the sample as follows: (1) excluding listed companies in the
financial and insurance industry; (2) excluding listed companies with asset-liability ratios less than
0 or greater than 1; (3) removing listed companies with more than two consecutive years of losses
(including ST, ST* and PT); (4) removing listed companies with missing relevant data. The
corporate innovation data in this paper comes from the Chinese Research Data Services Platform
(CNRDS), and the main financial data is from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research
database (CSMAR) and Wind database. After matching the above data, we get 20415 firm-year
observations. We winsorize the main continuous variable at 1% to limit the outlier effects.

3.2. Variables selected
3.2.1. Total factor productivity (TFP)
There is controversy about what is the best method of estimating firm-level total factor
productivity in the literature. Firm-level total factor productivity has been measured by a variety
of methods, including non-parametric methods (Jefferson et al., 2008), semi-parametric methods
(Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003), and parametric methods (Blundell and Bond,
1998). Non-parametric methods have major shortcomings, not only does it not cover
comprehensive information but also cannot solve the endogeneity problem. Although parametric
methods can solve the endogeneity problem, they require samples with a sufficiently long period
(Lu and Lian, 2012). Semi-parametric methods can effectively avoid the above problems.
Therefore, this study follows the works of Wang and Lu (2019), Peng et al. (2021) and Wang et al.
14
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(2021) and uses the models proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996, hereafter, OP) and Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003, hereafter, LP) to measure firm-level TFP.
First, we use the LP model to measure firm-level TFP, and the function is as follows:

ln Yit  a0  ak ln K it  al ln Lit  am ln M it   t   i   it

(1)

Second, we use the OP model to measure firm-level TFP, and the function is as follows:

ln Yit  b0  bk ln Kit  bl ln Lit  bi ln Iit  ba Ageit  bs SOEit   t   j k  it

(2)

Among them, Yit represents the enterprise output, which is measured by operating income;

K it represents the capital input, which is measured by net fixed assets; Lit represents the labor
input, which is measured by cash payments to and on behalf of employees; M it represents the
intermediate input, which is measured by cash paid for goods and services; I it represents the
investment, which is measured by the cash paid for fixed assets, intangible assets and other longterm assets1. Ageit is the age of the firm, and SOEit is a dummy variable that equals one if the
𝑖𝑡ℎ firm is a state-owned company.
fixed effects, respectively.

 t ,  i ,  j and k are the year, firm, city, and industry

 it is the error term. Notably, whether a firm exits the market is

considered in the OP model. The data on listed companies used in this paper have almost no exit
problem. Thus, we build a dummy variable ( Exit ) that equals 1 if a firm belongs to ST or PT
firms or if it was delisted or its industry code is changed, and 0 otherwise.
3.2.2. The Green Credit Guidelines in 2012
The Green Credit Guidelines in 2012 (GCG2012) requires the bank not to finance projects
which may waste resources and pollute the environment, leading to financing constraints for
polluting firms. On the macro level, the GCG2012 policy helps guide the flow of funds from
polluting investment to green investment. And on the micro level, the GCG2012 policy not only
helps financial institutions to strengthen oversight of fund users but also improves their own
environmental social responsibility.
The implementation of the GCG2012 makes the polluting firms face more severe regulation.

1

We add one to 𝑌, 𝐾, 𝐿, 𝑀, 𝐼 and then take the natural logarithm.
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The GCG2012 policy aims to force companies in green credit restricted industries to upgrade to
achieve green and sustainable development, rather than inhibit their development. Facing tighter
financing constraints, companies in green credit restricted industries have to improve productivity
to offset the negative impact of the GCG2012 on their profit. Therefore, we can regard the
GCG2012 policy as a natural experiment to explore the influence of green credit on the total factor
productivity of enterprises.
We conduct a DID to investigate the relationship between the GCG2012 and the total factor
productivity of enterprises. Following Wang and Wang (2021), we distinguish whether a firm
belongs to the green credit restricted industry according to its four-digit International Standard
Industrial Classification (hereafter, ISIC). According to the GCG2012, the China Banking
Regulatory Commission has formulated classification standards for environmental and social risk
in the Key Evaluation Indicators for Green Credit Implementation (CBRC, 2014). Specifically,
nine industries are defined as Class A2, including nuclear power generation, hydropower, water
conservancy and river port construction, coal mining and processing industry, petroleum and gas
extracting industry, ferrous metal mining and dressing industry, nonferrous metal mining and
dressing industry, non-metallic mineral mining and dressing industry and other mining industries
(CBRC, 2014). If the listed company belongs to these nine green credit restricted industries,

Treati equals one and we choose them as the treatment group; otherwise, Treati equals zero
and we choose them as the control group.
3.2.3. Control variables
Referring to existing literatures (Brandt et al., 2012; Wen et al., 2021; Demir et al., 2022),
we introduce a series of control variables to eliminate interference of firm’s economic
characteristics that may affect TFP: (1) firm size (Size) is measured by the logarithm of employee;
(2) firm performance (ROA) is measured by profit rate of assets; (3) firm age (LnAge) is measured
by the logarithm of the year that a firm has survived; (4) state-owned enterprises (SOE), a dummy
variable which equals one if a firm belongs to state-owned enterprises and zero otherwise; (5)
The Key Evaluation Indicators for Green Credit Implementation (CBRC, 2014) classifies clients into different
categories based on the environmental and social risks that they face. Class A refers to clients whose construction,
production and operating activities take a toll on the environment that cannot be easily eliminated. Class B refers
to clients whose construction, production and operating activities have negative environmental and social
consequences but can be more easily eliminated through mitigation measures. Class C refers to clients whose
construction, production and operating activities have no clearly adverse environmental and social consequences.
16
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enterprise growth (Growth) is defined as revenue growth rate; (6) capital structure (Lev) is defined
as debt asset ratio; (7) cash holdings (Cash) is measured by the sum of monetary funds and trading
financial assets divided by total assets; (8) proportion of fixed assets (Ppe) is measured by fixed
assets divided by total assets; (9) labor (Labor) is measured by total wage payments divided by
total employment; (10) the proportion of institutional investors shareholding (Inst); (11) operating
cash flow (CFO) is measured by cash flow from financing activities divided by total assets; (12)
capital expenditure ratio (Capital) is measured by capital expenditure divided by operating cash
flow.
The summary statistics of all variables used in the baseline regression are listed in Table 1.
Tfp_lp is calculated by the LP model, whose mean value is 6.490, the standard deviation is 0.899,
the minimum value is 4.496, and the maximum value is 8.847. This suggests that the total factor
productivity of firms varies considerably over the sample period, as does Tfp_op calculated by the
OP method. Moreover, other control variables differ significantly among the sample firms,
providing the possibility for studying whether the green credit policy affects firm-level total factor
productivity.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics.
Variable

Mean

Std. dev.

Min

Max

Tfp_lp
Tfp_op
Size
ROA
LnAge
SOE
Growth
Lev
Cash
Ppe
Labor
Inst
CFO
Capital

6.490
3.344
7.627
0.0437
2.078
0.423
0.441
0.442
2.859
0.227
11.32
46.87
0.044
0.010

0.899
0.713
1.313
0.057
0.829
0.494
1.367
0.210
16.16
0.168
0.628
23.62
0.074
0.045

4.505
1.861
4.174
-0.165
0
0
-0.697
0.048
-67.71
0.00231
9.856
0.493
-0.184
-0.091

8.847
5.327
11.16
0.217
3.219
1
10.30
0.883
94.16
0.720
13.29
90.79
0.249
0.321

3.3. Model specification
3.3.1. The effectiveness of GCG2012
Allen et al. (2005) take a skeptical attitude to China’s market-oriented reform, and they
17
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believe that the marketization mechanism is ineffective in China. The effective implementation of
GCG2012 is a prerequisite for studying the relationship between this policy and TFP. The
GCG2012 policy can affect firm-level TFP only if it has a real impact on the credit financing of
heavy polluting enterprises (Liu et al., 2019), which is the basis of research in this study. Thus, we
first examine whether the GCG2012 is effective in reducing the long-term liabilities of the heavy
polluting enterprise. We construct Equation 3 using a difference-in-differences methodology:

Debtijt = α0 + α1Treati  Postt + α3 X it + γt + δi + η j + εijt

(3)

where i represents enterprises, j represents 2-digit ISIC industries, and t represents years.

Debtijt is the logarithm of the long-term debt. Treati is a dummy variable used to identify the
green credit restricted industries, which equals 1 if a firm is in the treatment group, and 0
otherwise. Postt is the time dummy variable, which equals 1 for 2012-2019 and 0 for 20072011. α 1 captures the change in the long-term liabilities of the treatment group relative to the
control group over the policy period. X it represents a series of control variables, including firm
size ( Sizeit ), firm performance ( ROAit ), firm age ( LnAgeit ), state-owned enterprises ( SOEit ),
enterprise growth ( Growthit ), capital structure ( Levit ), cash holdings ( Cashit ), proportion of
fixed assets ( Ppeit ), labor ( Laborit ), the proportion of institutional investors shareholding
( Instit ), operating cash flow ( CFOit ) and capital expenditure ratio ( Capitalit ). γ t , δ i and η j
are the year, firm and two-digit ISIC industry fixed effects, respectively. ε ijt is the error term.
Following Zhang et al. (2019b), we also choose cluster robust standard errors at the city level.
3.3.2. The impact of the GCG2012 on TFP
The difference-in-differences method is widely used, because it can efficiently tackle the
problem of endogeneity in the regressions while effectively estimating policy effects (Wen and
Zhao, 2021). To examine the relationship between the Green Credit Guidelines and firm-level total
factor productivity, following Ren et al. (2019), this paper constructs a DID model:

TFPijt = 0 + 1Treati  Postt + 3 X it + γt + δi + η j + εijt

(4)

where TFPijt is the logarithm of firm-level TFP that is Tfp_lp and Tfp_op. The meanings of
18
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other variables are same as in Equation 3. We are most interested in the interaction term between

Treati and Postt ( Treati  Postt ), which examines the differential impact on the firm-level
TFP in green credit restricted industries and non-green credit-restricted industries before and after
the implementation of GCG2012. If

1 is significantly bigger than 0, the GCG2012 policy has

dramatically increased the firm-level TFP in green credit restricted industries.

4. Empirical results and analysis
4.1. Test on policy effectiveness
The original purpose of the GCG2012 is to force polluting enterprises to upgrade and switch
to the green economy. If the GCG2012 has not affected firm-level financing constraints in green
credit restricted industries, it is pointless to explore its other effects. Thus, our first priority is to
test whether the GCG2012 policy can effectively reduce the firm-level long-term debt.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 present the DID estimates of the impact of the GCG2012 on
firm-level debt corresponding to Equation 3. The coefficients of the interaction term
( Treat  Post ) are significantly negative, indicating that the GCG2012 is effective at improving
financing constraints in green credit restricted industries. This result is consistent with the study of
Yao et al. (2021) that shows the GCG2012 policy can increase corporate financing constraints.
After adding control variables, the coefficient of Treat  Post is significantly negative at the 1%
level as shown in column (2), suggesting that compared to the control group, the firm-level debt in
the treatment group declined by 49.03%3. Overall, the firms in green credit restricted industries
face more regulatory pressure than those in the control group after the GCG2012 policy.
The results of other control variables reported in Table 2 are as would be expected, which are
consistent with Liu et al. (2019). We analyze the regression results of the control variables with
firm, year and industry fixed effects. Size, LnAge, Lev, Labor, Inst and Capital can effectively
improve Debt, and they usually shore up the solvency of a firm (Wen et al., 2021). ROA, SOE,
Growth, Cash and Ppe have no effect on Debt, and CFO has a significant negative effect on Debt.

Because the logarithm of Debt and TFP are used in our regression, we use
effect.
19
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4.2. Benchmark findings
This study estimates the impact of the GCG2012 policy on firm-level TFP corresponding to
Equation 4, and the results with firm, year and industry fixed effects are shown in column (3) to
column (6) of Table 2.
The explained variable in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 is Tfp_lp that calculated by the LP
method. The regression results show that the coefficients of Treat  Post , which we are most
interested in, are positive and highly significant after controlling for the individual fixed effects,
time fixed effects and industry fixed effects. After adding control variables, the coefficient of

Treat  Post is significantly positive at the 1% level as shown in column (4), suggesting the
firm-level TFP in the treatment group declined by 18.41% more than the control group after the
GCG2012 policy.
The explained variable in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 is Tfp_op that calculated by the OP
method. The regression results show that the coefficients of Treat  Post are positive and
highly significant after controlling for the individual fixed effects, time fixed effects and industry
fixed effects. After adding control variables, the coefficient of Treat  Post is significantly
positive at the 1% level as shown in column (6), suggesting that the firm-level TFP in the
treatment group declined by 26.36% more than the control group after the GCG2012 policy.
In conclusion, no matter whether TFP is calculated by the OP model or the LP model, the
GCG2012 policy significantly increases the firm-level total factor productivity of the treatment
group compared to the control group, demonstrating the robustness of the results and the validity
of Hypothesis 1.
The underlying rationale is as follows. On the one hand, in theory, the GCG2012 policy
mainly uses the financing channel to make enterprise environmental costs endogenous, and raise
the costs of debt financing in the short term. After the GCG2012 is enforced, if the enterprise
continues to maintain the original technology and production methods that emit a lot of pollution,
it will face worse credit availability and higher loan cost (Liu et al., 2017; He et al., 2019). And it
may even weaken its market competitiveness. Therefore, even without considering the need for
clean technology, companies in green credit restricted industries need to intensify innovation and
improve productivity to offset the negative impact of GCG2012 on financial profit. Thus, in the
20
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long term, the real purpose of the green credit policy is to promote the green development of
companies in green credit restricted industries, rather than inhibiting their upgrading.
On the other hand, in terms of policy inspiration, the GCG2012 policy designed by the China
Banking Regulatory Commission is an extension and innovation of traditional environmental
regulation. In contrast to the current environmental regulations, the green credit policy plays a
significant role in environmental governance by optimizing capital allocation. It can increase
green investment and reduce polluting investment, and ultimately achieve the goal of green
development (Wen et al., 2021). Facing the dual challenges of environmental pollution and
economic transformation, the GCG2012 policy provides an important direction for the
environmental policy in China.
The results of other control variables are as would be expected. We mainly analyze the
regression results of the control variables with firm, year and industry fixed effects, as shown in
column (4) and column (6) of Table 2. ROA, Growth, Lev and CFO are the important indicators
for an enterprise’s operation, and the results show that the better performance, the easier it is for a
company to increase its total factor productivity. And Wen et al. (2021) come to a similar
conclusion. LnAge has a positive effect on TFP, indicating that only companies with higher
competitiveness are likely to survive longer and have higher productivity (Peng et al., 2021).
Institutional investors can help companies to have a more accurate analysis of markets and
policies, which is conducive to improving corporate governance (Cornett et al., 2007), as
evidenced by the coefficient of Inst in this paper. Conversely, Ppe has a negative effect on TFP,
probably because of the low liquidity of fixed assets, which is not conducive to enterprise
upgrading. In addition, SOE Cash and Capital are not statistically significant.
Table 2 Mian results on the long-term debt and total factor productivity.
Dependent Variable:
Treat×Post

(1)
Debt

(2)
Debt

(3)
Tfp_lp

(4)
Tfp_lp

(5)
Tfp_op

(6)
Tfp_op

-0.395*
(-1.84)

-0.399**
(-2.32)
0.999***
(15.68)
0.625
(1.39)
0.821***
(10.91)

0.112**
(1.99)

0.210***
(4.86)
0.276***
(18.49)
2.284***
(24.41)
0.040**
(2.16)

0.169***
(3.24)

0.234***
(5.49)
-0.048***
(-3.20)
2.231***
(24.04)
0.037**
(2.13)

Size
ROA
LnAge
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SOE
Growth
Lev
Cash
Ppe
Labor
Inst
CFO
Capital
Constant
Controls
Firm FE
Year FE
Industry FE
Observations
R-squared

9.043***
(2,168.67)
YES
YES
YES
YES
20,382
0.736

0.108
(0.80)
0.013
(0.90)
4.556***
(21.39)
0.001
(0.43)
-0.191
(-0.67)
0.942***
(14.72)
0.009***
(3.40)
-1.750***
(-5.62)
0.767*
(1.75)
-13.378***
(-12.57)
YES
YES
YES
YES
20,382
0.783

6.496***
(5,931.83)
YES
YES
YES
YES
20,415
0.871

-0.024
(-0.56)
0.012***
(2.62)
0.695***
(15.32)
0.0002
(1.54)
-1.168***
(-16.92)
0.246***
(10.85)
0.002***
(4.49)
0.381***
(7.02)
-0.159*
(-1.95)
1.266***
(3.83)
YES
YES
YES
YES
20,415
0.912

3.349***
(3,319.12)
YES
YES
YES
YES
20,415
0.834

-0.019
(-0.44)
0.013***
(2.96)
0.712***
(15.43)
0.0002
(1.24)
-0.801***
(-12.41)
-0.114***
(-4.98)
0.002***
(4.39)
0.369***
(7.21)
-0.106
(-1.29)
4.587***
(13.53)
YES
YES
YES
YES
20,415
0.863

Notes: This table shows the influences of the GCG2012 of Debt and TFP. The dependent variables are the firmlevel long-term debt (Debt) and total factor productivity measured by the LP model (Tfp_lp) and the OP model
(Tfp_op), respectively. The interaction term (Treat×Post) is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm belongs to
the green credit restricted industries in 2012 and beyond. All other variables are defined in Section 3.2.3. *, **, and
*** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are clustered at the
city-level level; the numbers in parentheses are t-values.

4.3. Robust analysis
4.3.1. Parallel trend assumption
The DID estimates need to meet the identification assumption that the treatment group has
the same trend line of change as the control group in the absence of policy intervention. The
baseline regression results reflect the average treatment effect of the GCG2012 policy on firmlevel TFP, and do not capture the impact of the GCG2012 policy over time. Therefore, this study
uses the Event Study Approach proposed by Jacobson et al. (1993), to estimate the dynamic
22
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effects of the GCG2012 policy, and constructs the following model:

TFPijt = 0 +

2019



t  2007,t  2011

t Treati  Postt +3 X + γt + δi + η j + εijt

(5)

where 2010, the year before the GCG2012 policy implementation, is used as the base year and  t
denotes a series of estimates from 2007-2019. The meanings of other variables are same as in
Equation 4.
Fig.1 depicts the estimated results of Tfp_lp and Tfp_op at the 95% confidence intervals and
finds that  t are not significant in 2007-2010, indicating that there is no obvious difference
between the treatment and control groups before the implementation of the GCG2012 policy,
satisfying the parallel trend assumption. Moreover, we can find that after the implementation of
the policy,  t becomes gradually larger from 2012 to 2019, suggesting that the effect of the
GCG2012 policy has become greater and greater over time. Therefore, the GCG2012 policy has
an increasing effect on promoting total factor productivity of companies in green credit restricted
industries. Table A1 shows the specific coefficients of Treat  Postt , representing the dynamic
effects of the GCG2012 policy.

a.

b.

Fig.1. The parallel trend test of the GCG2012 policy and TFP. Notes: Fig. 1a and b report the results of Tfp_lp and
Tfp_op, respectively. Figure presents the 95% confidence intervals and coefficients of 𝜃𝑡 which represents the
interaction term between 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 with firm, year and industry fixed effects. We select 2011 as the base
year, so Treat×Post2011 is excluded. The dependent variables are the total factor productivity measured by the LP
model (Tfp_lp) and the OP model (Tfp_op), respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at the city-level level.
23
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4.3.2. Placebo test
To further prove that the baseline results in this study are not by chance, we conduct a
bootstrapping placebo test following Cai et al. (2016) by creating a placebo treatment. Specifically,
the treatment group is randomly selected from our sample, and the others are regarded as the
control group. Random sampling ensures that the independent variable ( Treat  Post )
constructed in the placebo test has no effect on the total factor productivity of firms. In other
words, any significant results in the placebo test would indicate that the baseline results in this
paper are biased. We repeat the random sampling 500 times and 10000 times, and then perform
the baseline regression on these pseudo-samples corresponding to Equation 4, as shown in Fig.A1
and Fig.2.
We can see that the coefficients of all Treat  Post in the pseudo-regressions are close to
zero and are smaller than those in the true regression. Also, the true estimates in this paper
(columns (4) and (6) of Table 2) are significant outliers in the placebo test. The distributions of the

Treat  Post coefficients and their p-values are further plotted in Fig.A1 and Fig.2. The
Treat  Post coefficients are close to zero point and most of their corresponding p-values are
greater than 0.1 and insignificant. Therefore, the placebo test suggests that the baseline results in
this paper are robust and not a case of chance.

a.

b.

Fig.2. The placebo test of the GCG2012 policy and TFP repeat 10000 times. Notes: Fig. 2a and b report the results
of Tfp_lp and Tfp_op, respectively. The x-axis represents estimated coefficients. The curve represents the kernel
density and the points represent p-values of 10000 estimates of Treat×Post randomly. The vertical line is the
estimate of TFP in columns (4) and (6) of Table 2.
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4.3.3. Propensity score matching (PSM) estimation
Considering the differences among our sample, we use Propensity Score MatchingDifference in Differences (PSM-DID) method to re-estimate Equation 4. The idea of the PSM
method is to select a control group with the most similar characteristics to the treatment group
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Specifically, the logit model is used to match the new control
group4. In this logit model, the dependent variable is Treati which is a dummy variable, and
independent variables are the control variables introduced in Section 3.2.3. In addition, the
characteristics of the firms in the treatment group are not static. And not all the firms are
consistently present during the sample period (2007-2019), as some were listed after 2007 and
some were delisted before 2019. Thus, the treatment group is matched year by year to obtain
another control group.
The PSM sample has highly similarity between the treatment and control groups, so we can
consider that the difference in the firm-level total factor productivity between the treatment and
control groups is mainly influenced by the GCG2012 policy. Table 3 reports the results of the reestimation of Equation 4 using the PSM sample. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 present the results
of the PSM sample obtained by matching the sample without distinguishing the year. Columns (3)
and (4) of Table 3 present the results of the PSM sample obtained by matching the sample year by
year. All coefficients of Treat  Post are positive and significant, again demonstrating that the
GCG2012 can significantly increase firm-level total factor productivity in green credit restricted
industries.
Table 3 PSM-DID results of the GCG2012 policy and TFP.
Dependent Variable:
Treat×Post
Constant
Controls
Firm FE
Year FE
Industry FE
Observations
4

(1)
Tfp_lp

(2)
Tfp_op

(3)
Tfp_lp

(4)
Tfp_op

0.237**
(2.50)
0.734
(0.42)
YES
YES
YES
YES
14,557

0.267***
(3.08)
3.728**
(2.06)
YES
YES
YES
YES
14,557

0.186**
(2.28)
-1.042
(-0.62)
YES
YES
YES
YES
15,153

0.204***
(2.78)
1.546
(0.91)
YES
YES
YES
YES
15,153

The k-nearest neighbor matching is used in this study where k is 2 and caliper size is 0.05.
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R-squared

0.961

0.943

0.948

0.929

Notes: The meanings of variables are the same as in Table 2. *, **, and *** represent the significance levels of
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are clustered at the city-level level; the numbers in
parentheses are t-values.

4.3.4. Multiple fixed effect models
In the baseline regression, we control year fixed effects and firm fixed effects that can
effectively control the influence of most unobserved factors. Although the listed firms we used in
this study do not change provinces and industries easily, such small probability events still exist.
Referring to Liu (2016), to further control the province-level and industry-level potential factors
that change with time, this paper builds a multiple fixed-effect model. Columns (1) and (2) of
Table 4 report the results of the multiple fixed-effect model including year fixed effects, provinceyear fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects. The reexamination results are significantly
positive, indicating that our baseline results are robust.
4.3.5. Alternative indicator
In benchmark regression, we choose the firms in the green credit restricted industries as the
treatment group according to the Key Evaluation Indicators for Green Credit Implementation
(CBRC, 2014). But the treatment group used in benchmark regression contains only nine
industries. Doing so can get more accurate results, but this policy is not enacted until two years
after the GCG2012. Some financial institutions may still follow the standards set by other policies
to define polluting industries. Thus, referring to Zhang et al. (2019a), we redefine polluting
industries according to the Guidelines for Industry Classification of Listed Companies, including
coal mining and processing industry, petroleum and gas extracting industry, etc (SEPA, 2010). If
the listed company belongs to these 16 polluting industries, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 equals one and we choose
them as the treatment group; otherwise, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 equals zero and we choose them as the control
group.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 report the results of an alternative measure of the polluting
industries. The coefficients of Treat  Post are positive and statistically significant, no matter
whether the explanatory variable is Tfp_lp or Tfp_op. The results indicate that the GCG2012
policy can improve the TFP of polluting enterprises effectively, proving the robustness of our
results.
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4.3.6. Extend sample period
The sample period used in this study is from 2007 to 2019. The reason that we exclude 2020
is because the COVID-19 has severely impacted global economic development. To further verify
the robustness of the results, we include firm-level data in 2020. The last two columns of Table 4
show the results of adding the 2020 sample. The significance and magnitude of the coefficients of

Treat  Post are very close to those of the baseline regression.
Table 4 Robustness analyses: multiple fixed effects, alternative indicator and extend sample
period
(1)
(2)
Multiple Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable:
Treat×Post
Constant
Controls
Firm FE
Year FE
Industry FE
Industry*Year FE
Province*Year FE
Observations
R-squared

(5)

(6)

(3)
(4)
Alternative Indicator

Extend Sample Period

Tfp_lp

Tfp_op

Tfp_lp

Tfp_op

Tfp_lp

Tfp_op

0.172**
(2.58)
1.333***
(3.90)
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
20,338
0.921

0.184***
(3.05)
4.623***
(13.46)
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
20,338
0.877

0.019*
(1.85)
-1.819***
(-8.46)
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
20,414
0.919

0.048***
(4.57)
0.405*
(1.86)
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
20,414
0.868

0.220***
(4.99)
1.073***
(3.53)
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
22,508
0.908

0.245***
(5.63)
4.436***
(14.24)
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
22,508
0.858

Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the results of controlling firm fixed effects with industry-year fixed effects and
province-year fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) report the results of alternative measure of the polluting industries.
Columns (5) and (6) report the results of adding the 2020 sample. The meanings of variables are the same as in
Table 2. *, **, and *** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors
are clustered at the city-level level; the numbers in parentheses are t-values.

4.3.7. Exclude delisted companies and companies listed after 2012
Firstly, the listed company is not easily delisted, but such a situation does exist. A listed
company will face worse credit availability and higher loan cost when it is at greater risk of
delisting because the bank is keenly aware of its improper operation. Thus, firms on the verge of
delisting face even worse credit availability. We cannot distinguish precisely whether their lower
TFP are caused by the GCG2012 or by their own operations. To address this endogeneity problem,
we remove the delisted companies and re-estimate Equation 4. As shown in columns (1) and (2) of
Table 4, the coefficients of Treat  Post are similar to the coefficients in baseline regression,
suggesting that the implementation of the GCG2012 policy does effectively force the treatment
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group to improve their firm-level TFP, which is irrelevant to their own business.
Secondly, this study uses the DID method to test the relationship between the GCG2012 and
firm-level TFP. We need to analyze two changes: one is the change in firm-level TFP after the
GCG2012 policy was enforced, and the other is the change in firm-level TFP of green credit
restricted industries compared to non-green credit restricted industries. Therefore, we focus on
two factors at the same time, namely time (policy period) and industry (green credit restricted
industry). However, some companies go public after 2012, whose data before 2012 is missing,
leading to difficulty to analyze the impact of the GCG2012 on them. That is, we can only observe
the impact of the GCG2012 policy on these companies after the policy was enacted and are
unable to compare them with the pre-policy period, which may bias the results. Thus, we remove
the companies listed after 2012 and re-estimate Equation 4. As shown in columns (3) and (4) of
Table 4, the coefficients of Treat  Post are similar to the coefficients in baseline regression.
Lastly, we remove both the delisted companies and the companies listed after 2012 and reestimate Equation 4. The results reported in the last two columns of Table 5 are consistent with the
baseline regression, further demonstrating the reliability of our conclusions.
Table 5 Robustness analyses: exclude delisted companies and companies listed after 2012
Dependent Variable:
Treat×Post
Constant
Controls
Firm FE
Year FE
Industry FE
Observations
R-squared

(1)
Tfp_lp

(2)
Tfp_op

(3)
Tfp_lp

(4)
Tfp_op

(5)
Tfp_lp

(6)
Tfp_op

0.209***
(4.86)
1.338***
(3.99)
YES
YES
YES
YES
18,869
0.909

0.233***
(5.49)
4.641***
(13.40)
YES
YES
YES
YES
18,869
0.857

0.201***
(4.52)
1.140***
(3.41)
YES
YES
YES
YES
19,978
0.914

0.223***
(5.08)
4.485***
(13.21)
YES
YES
YES
YES
19,978
0.865

0.201***
(4.52)
1.205***
(3.54)
YES
YES
YES
YES
18,438
0.912

0.223***
(5.08)
4.533***
(13.05)
YES
YES
YES
YES
18,438
0.859

Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the results of dropping the delisted companies. Columns (3) and (4) report the
results of dropping the companies listed after 2012. Columns (5) and (6) report the results of dropping both the
delisted companies and the companies listed after 2012. The meanings of variables are the same as in Table 2. *,
**, and *** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are
clustered at the city-level level; the numbers in parentheses are t-values.

4.3.8. The influence of the financial crisis
The financial crisis of 2008 severely affected the economic development of many countries,
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leading to unusual volatility in financial markets. Financial institutions did not have enough
resources to invest. The main effect of the financial crisis on our sample reflects in their financing
needs and investment needs. First, following Durnev and Kim (2005), we measure potential
external financing needs of companies to control for changes in their own financing needs by
constructing External5, which is a continuous variable. Secondly, referring to Ding and Knight
(2011), we use Salegrowth, which is the annual rate of increase of main business revenue, to
measure the investment needs of companies.
We introduce both External and Salegrowth as control variables in Equation 4 to control the
effect of the financial crisis. The re-estimated results of Equation 4 are shown in columns (1) and
(2) of Table 6. The coefficients of External are both significantly negative, indicating that firms
with high financing needs face the cash crunch and thus they do not have more resources to
improve the TFP. The coefficients of Salegrowth are both significantly positive, indicating that
firms with high investment needs have enough capital to improve their TFP. And the coefficients
of Treat  Post , which we are most interested in, are positive and highly significant, suggesting
that our conclusions are unrelated to the financial crisis.
Then, considering the events such as the financial crisis of 2008 and the Beijing Olympics
that occurred during the sample period may have confounded the results of this study. And these
events cannot be done in one day, they need time. Thus, we exclude observations from 2007 and
2008. As shown in the last two columns of Table 6, the conclusions are consistent with those in
Table 2.
Table 6 Robustness analyses: the influence of the financial crisis
Dependent Variable:
Treat×Post
External
Salegrowth
Constant
Controls

(1)
Tfp_lp

(2)
Tfp_op

(3)
Tfp_lp

(4)
Tfp_op

0.193***
(4.28)
-0.081***
(-3.31)
0.073***
(4.87)
1.470***
(4.31)
YES

0.217***
(4.93)
-0.057**
(-2.00)
0.077***
(5.29)
4.778***
(13.50)
YES

0.192***
(4.03)

0.210***
(4.68)

1.170***
(3.34)
YES

4.571***
(12.79)
YES

𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 = (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡 − 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 )/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡 /(1 − 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡 ), where 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 represents the total assets of
the enterprise, and 𝑅𝑂𝐸 represents the return on equity of the enterprise.
29
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Firm FE
Year FE
Industry FE
Observations
R-squared

YES
YES
YES
19,823
0.917

YES
YES
YES
19,823
0.872

YES
YES
YES
17,907
0.923

YES
YES
YES
17,907
0.880

Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the results of adding external and salegrowth. Columns (3) and (4) report the
results of dropping both the 2007 and 2008 sample. The meanings of variables are the same as in Table 2. *, **,
and *** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are clustered at
the city-level level; the numbers in parentheses are t-values.

4.4. Difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD)
One issue in the DID model we proposed is that other environmental policies may also affect
the firm-level TFP of the treatment and control group in addition to the GCG2012 policy, which
may bias the estimates. Therefore, to distinguish the GCG2012 policy effects from other
environmental policy effects in the same period is one of the key and difficult points of this study.
Compared with other traditional environmental policies in the same period, the characteristic of
the GCG2012 is that it mainly uses the financing channel to make enterprise environmental costs
endogenous. Following Lu et al. (2021), we further construct the DDD model by adding the
corporate credit constraints to Equation 4 to mitigate the effect of other environmental policies on
causal connections.
Theoretically, polluting firms that are more dependent on external financing are relatively
more affected by the GCG2012, while other traditional environmental policies do not have an
immediate impact on credit availability. That is, if the change in the firm-level TFP of our sample
is entirely influenced by other traditional environmental policies but not by the GCG2012, the
GCG2012 cannot have significant heterogeneity effects on the TFP of companies in green credit
restricted industries with different external financing reliance. Specifically, we use “net accounts
receivable/total assets” to measure corporate credit constraints, namely Cre. The firm with higher
Cre is easier to rely on external financing and more susceptible to the GCG2012. We employ a
dummy variable to classify corporate credit constraints, namely Credit. To further excavate the
causal relationship between the Green Credit Guidelines and firm-level total factor productivity,
this study constructs a DDD model:

TFPijt = 0 + 1Treati  Postt  Crediti  2Treati  Postt + 3Treati  Creditt
+ 4 Postt  Crediti + 5 X it + γt + δi + η j + ε ijt

(6)
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where, Credit is a dummy variable, and if 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗 is higher than the median of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ industry in
our sample by year, 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖 equals 1; otherwise, 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖 equals zero6. The meanings of other
variables are same as in Equation 4. We are most interested in the coefficients of the interaction
term ( Treati  Postt  Crediti ), which test the causal relationship between the firm-level TFP
and the GCG2012. If 1 is significantly bigger than 0, the GCG2012 policy can better boost the
TFP of firms with stricter commercial credit constraints in green credit restricted industries. Table
7 reports the average treatment effects of the DDD model corresponding to Equation 6, which are
generally consistent with those of the DID model corresponding to Equation 4. Thus, the results of
this paper empirically demonstrate that the GCG2012 policy has contributed to boosting the firmlevel TFP.
Table 7 The results of DDD method
Dependent Variable:
Treat×Post×Credit
Treat×Post
Treat×Credit
Post×Credit
Constant
Controls
Firm FE
Year FE
Industry FE
Observations
R-squared

(1)
Tfp_lp

(2)
Tfp_op

0.173**
(2.24)
0.111
(1.53)
-0.116*
(-1.68)
-0.076***
(-6.83)
1.387***
(4.26)
YES
YES
YES
YES
20,402
0.913

0.153**
(2.06)
0.146**
(2.13)
-0.084
(-1.26)
-0.070***
(-6.24)
4.668***
(14.03)
YES
YES
YES
YES
20,402
0.864

Notes: This table shows the results excluding the effects of other environmental policies. The meanings of
variables are the same as in Table 2. *, **, and *** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively; Robust standard errors are clustered at the city-level level; the numbers in parentheses are t-values.

𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖 equals 1, indicating that the 𝑖𝑡ℎ firm faces stricter commercial credit constraints and higher reliance on
external financing; and 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖 equals 0, indicating that the 𝑖𝑡ℎ firm faces more ease commercial credit
constraints and lower reliance on external financing.
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4.5. Heterogeneity analysis
The effects of the GCG2012 policy may be affected by the enterprises’ own specific
situation, the industry environment and the macroscopic environment factors. Thus, this
subsection explores the heterogeneity effects of the GCG2012 on firm-level TFP by ownership,
debt-paying ability, industrial competition degree and province financial marketization.
4.5.1 Heterogeneity tests based on firm-level characteristics
Firstly, we test the heterogeneity effect of the GCG2012 on state-owned enterprises (hereafter,
SOEs) and private enterprises (hereafter, non-SOEs). In recent years, the differences between
SOEs and non-SOEs have caused considerable controversy. Some scholars point out that only
privatization reforms can solve the efficiency problems of SOEs (Jefferson and Su, 2006). Other
scholars argue that the privatization reform of SOEs cannot solve the existing problems and may
even lead to the loss of state assets (Lin et al., 1998). Our results imply that the GCG2012 policy
can effetely boost the firm-level TFP. Nonetheless, it is necessary to note that the GCG2012 policy
is an act that the government indirectly intervenes in the market, essentially. Thus, is the
GCG2012 more likely to improve the TFP of SOEs or non-SOEs?
The GCG2012 may have different impacts on the TFP of SOEs and non-SOEs because they
are significant differences in political connection, business objective, the external environment,
interior corporate governance, and so on. In political connection, SOEs correlate more closely to
the government than non-SOEs (Wang and Lu, 2019). SOEs can get more information about
policies, thereby making changes in time. In business objective, non-SOEs are more focused on
pursuing financial benefits, while SOEs are more focused on social responsibility (Lin et al.,
2004). Thus, SOEs may take on more tasks to reduce emissions. The environmental policies may
achieve their goals by sacrificing SOEs’ interests. In the external environment, SOEs face a better
external management environment, including greater credit availability and more policy trend
(Allen et al., 2005), and thus have less incentive to increase their TFP. In interior corporate
governance, SOEs are easily controlled by managers, having a weaker level of corporate
governance, thereby leading to slower TFP growth.
Columns (1) and (3) of panel A in Table 8 report the effect of the GCG2012 on the SOEs’
TFP, and the coefficients of Treat  Post are significantly positive at the 1% level. Columns (2)
32
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and (4) of panel A in Table 8 report the effect of the GCG2012 on the non-SOEs’ TFP, and the
coefficients of Treat  Post are significantly positive at the 10% level. These results show that
the GCG2012 policy can both boost the TFP of SOEs and non-SOEs. Further comparing the value
of the coefficients of Treat  Post for SOEs and non-SOEs, we find that the GCG2012 has a
greater influence on non-SOEs. These also suggest that the GCG2012 is stricter for non-SOEs,
thereby prodding them to improve their TFP.
Secondly, we test the heterogeneity effect of the GCG2012 on firm-level TFP by debt-paying
ability. Debt-paying ability refers to a company’s ability to repay its debts, that is, its ability to
repay its debts with earnings from operating activities. The debt-paying ability directly affects
whether the enterprise can repay the principal and interest of the loan on time. The better the debtpaying ability of an enterprise is, the easier it is to obtain funding. On the one hand, banks tend to
provide more loans or renew loans to companies with better debt-paying ability. On the other hand,
other financial institutions are more willing to invest in companies with better debt-paying ability.
In general, companies with better debt-paying ability are more preferred among financial
institutions and investors, and have weaker financing constraints. Thus, the GCG2012 puts less
regulatory pressure on companies with better debt-paying ability than others, because they have
easier credit availability and richer financing channels.
We use liquidity rate which is current assets divided by current liabilities to measure the debtpaying ability. Specifically, the sample is further subdivided into two subsamples according to the
median of liquidity rate by year. Then, we re-estimate Equation 4 and the results are shown in
panel B in Table 8. We can find that the coefficients of Treat  Post in the better debt-paying
ability subsample are positive and insignificant, and the coefficients of Treat  Post in the
worse debt-paying ability subsample are significantly positive at the 1% level, indicating that the
GCG2012 only can increase the firm-level TFP in green credit restricted industries with worse
debt-paying ability. The finding is in line with our analysis, that is, the GCG2012 fail to prod
companies in green credit restricted industries with better debt-paying ability in green credit
restricted industries to improve their TFP. The result suggests the GCG2012 does affect firm-level
TFP by changing capital flows.
4.5.2 Heterogeneity tests based on industry-level characteristic
The GCG2012 policy may also have significant heterogeneity effects on firm-level TFP in
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industries with different degrees of competition. On the one hand, companies in highly
competitive industries have greater abilities to gather and use information about the market and
government, so they can adjust themselves to the new policy as soon as possible (Coibion et al.,
2018). On the other hand, Melville et al. (2007) find that companies under high competitive
pressure are more likely to increase innovation and productivity. Therefore, facing the dual policy
and market test, companies in highly competitive industries may have more motivation to boost
their TFP.
Specifically, we measure industry competition degree as the inverse of the standard deviation
of main business profit margin for all sample companies of the same industry in the same year and
classify the industries according to the two-digit ISIC industries (Nickell, 1996). Then, our sample
is further subdivided into two subsamples according to the median of industry competition degree
by year. Columns (1) and (3) of panel C in Table 8 report the effect of the GCG2012 on the firmlevel TFP in highly competitive industries, and the coefficients of Treat  Post

are

significantly positive at the 1% level. Columns (2) and (4) of panel C in Table 8 report the effect
of the GCG2012 on the firm-level TFP in less competitive industries, and the coefficients of

Treat  Post are negative and insignificant. These results show that the GCG2012 policy only
boosts the firm-level TFP in highly competitive industries, but is ineffective in less competitive
industries. This result is consistent with our analysis that heavy polluting enterprises in highly
competitive industries have more incentive and pressure to improve TFP than companies in less
competitive industries. Companies in less competitive industries rest on their laurels and then
stagnate because of a lack of competition, resulting in the coefficients of Treat  Post are
negative in columns (2) and (4).
4.5.3 Heterogeneity tests based on province-level characteristic
Financial liberalization is defined as a shift in the operation of financial sectors and the
allocation of financial resources from being primarily regulated by the government to being
primarily determined by the market. Financial liberalization has significant effects on corporate
performance and economic welfare, and has been the main aim of financial reform in developing
countries since the 1970s. The financial system structure largely determines the financing channels
of firms, which in turn influences the effect of policies on the entity enterprises (Ma and Lin,
2016). The financial system becomes more and more consummate and widens the channel for
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investment and financing in China. Heavy polluting enterprises in regions with high financial
liberalization may be better affected by the GCG2012. The reason is that the higher the financial
liberalization, the richer the financing channels, thus easing the financing constraints of heavy
polluters. Since the implementation of the GCG2012 policy, enterprises in green credit restricted
industries have faced worse credit availability and higher loan cost, resulting in insufficient funds
for innovation and even production. The improvement of financial liberalization can help alleviate
this problem. Thus, the higher financial liberalization can help the GCG2012 to prod companies in
green credit restricted industries to boost their TFP more quickly.
We use the financial marketization index proposed by Wang et al. (2019) to measure
financial liberalization. Specifically, the sample is further subdivided into two subsamples
according to the tertiles of financial liberalization by year (𝐹𝐿𝑡 ). If the firm is in a province with
financial liberalization greater than 𝐹𝐿𝑡 , we include it in the higher financial liberalization
subsample; otherwise, we include it in the lower financial liberalization subsample. Columns (1)
and (3) of panel D in Table 8 report the effect of the GCG2012 on firm-level TFP of the higher
financial liberalization subsample, and the coefficients of Treat  Post are significantly
positive at the 1% level. Columns (2) and (4) of panel A in Table 8 report the effect of the
GCG2012 on firm-level TFP of the lower financial liberalization subsample, and the coefficients
of Treat  Post are also significantly positive at the 1% level. These results show that the
GCG2012 policy can both boost the TFP of the two subsamples.
Further comparing the value of the coefficients of Treat  Post for the two subsamples,
we find that the GCG2012 has a greater influence on heavy polluting enterprises in the higher
financial liberalization subsample, which is consistent with our analysis. The GCG2012 has
reduced the credit availability of companies in green credit restricted industries. Companies in
green credit restricted industries with stricter financing constraints don’t have enough fund to
promote green development, leading to higher credit costs. It’s a vicious circle. Thus, in the short
term, the GCG2012 may have negative effects on the TFP of heavy polluting enterprises (Wen et
al., 2021). The higher financial liberalization can provide more funding for the upgrade of
polluting enterprises to reach the required standard of the GCG2012, which can help solve this
problem. In the long term, the GCG2012 aims to prod companies in green credit restricted
industries to shift toward a green economy, rather than inhibit their development. And the higher
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financial liberalization can help the GCG2012 policy do this.
Table 8 Heterogeneity analyses.
(1)
Dependent Variable:
Panel A: Ownership
Treat×Post
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Empirical p-values
Panel B: Debt-paying ability
Treat×Post
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Empirical p-values
Panel C: Industrial competition degree
Treat×Post
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Empirical p-values
Panel D: Financial marketization
Treat×Post
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Empirical p-values
Controls
Firm FE
Year FE
Industry FE

(2)

(3)

Tfp_lp
SOEs

Tfp_op

Non-SOEs

0.163***
0.349*
(3.53)
(1.76)
1.418**
1.364***
(2.52)
(3.60)
8,765
11,573
0.926
0.905
-0.185***
Better

Worse

0.067
0.211***
(0.48)
(4.49)
1.690***
2.403***
(3.65)
(4.63)
9,845
10,091
0.868
0.917
-0.144***
Higher

Lower

0.289***
-0.109
(6.29)
(-0.57)
1.647***
0.982**
(4.29)
(2.06)
10,075
9,433
0.917
0.933
0.397***
Higher

Lower

0.246***
0.161***
(2.81)
(3.19)
1.094***
1.736***
(2.77)
(3.58)
11,823
8,461
0.917
0.916
0.085**
YES
YES
YES
YES

(4)

YES
YES
YES
YES

SOEs

Non-SOEs

0.193***
0.342*
(4.13)
(1.70)
4.648***
4.746***
(9.02)
(11.56)
8,765
11,573
0.880
0.866
-0.149***
Better

Worse

0.082
0.232***
(0.60)
(5.03)
5.119***
5.516***
(10.85)
(10.69)
9,845
10,091
0.853
0.885
-0.149***
Higher

Lower

0.311***
-0.077
(7.02)
(-0.40)
4.890***
4.353***
(13.58)
(8.98)
10,075
9,433
0.874
0.892
0.389***
Higher

Lower

0.243***
0.197***
(2.93)
(3.96)
4.334***
5.115***
(10.31)
(11.68)
11,823
8,461
0.878
0.858
0.046**
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES

Notes: This table shows the results of four heterogeneity analyses. The meanings of variables are the same as in
Table 2. *, **, and *** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; robust standard errors
are clustered at the city-level level; the numbers in parentheses are t-values. Empirical p-value represents the
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difference in coefficients of TFP between the two groups and is obtained by bootstrap 1000 times.

4.6. Potential mechanisms
Thus far, our results show that the GCG2012 policy can improve the firm-level TFP in the
treatment group. Then what is the mechanism of its effect? As mentioned above, the GCG2012
may influence the firm-level TFP through two potential channels. Firstly, the GCG2012 puts great
pressure to polluting enterprises’ financing. Considering the long-term interests, companies in
green credit restricted industries reconsider the allocation of capital. They have to intensify
innovation to improve productivity, which can reduce the pressure on their credit. And to meet the
requirements of the GCG2012, they also need to realize green technological innovation. Secondly,
the GCG2012 significantly increases the cost of environmental regulation for companies, which
outweighs the benefits of the model of inefficient and blind development. Facing the high cost of
the GCG2012, shareholders have a strong incentive to urge companies to increase the TFP to
reduce costs. Moreover, the higher cost of environmental regulation would strengthen the
monitoring function of the GCG2012, thus reducing agency costs. The credit monitoring function
of green credit also prods managers to work harder for enterprise upgrading. Following Baron and
Kenny (1986) and Wen et al. (2004), we use the mediating effect method to test these two
mechanisms, and construct the following models:

TFPijt = 0 + 1Treati  Postt + 3 X it + γt + δi + η j + εijt

(4)

Medijt = 0 + 1Treati  Postt + 3 X it + γt + δi + η j + εijt

(7)

TFPijt = 0 +1Treati  Postt +2 Medijt  3 X it + γt + δi + η j + εijt

(8)

where Medijt represents the intermediary variables, including technological innovation and
agency costs. The meanings of other variables are same as in Equation 4. In this subsection, the
first step of the mediating effect model is consistent with our baseline regression, so we only
report the results corresponding to Equation 7 and Equation 8.
4.6.1. Technological innovation
Technological innovation is an important contributor to total factor productivity (Liu and Xin,
2019). And environmental regulation promotes innovation, which leads to productivity growth
(Hamamoto, 2006). Intuitively, we expect that the GCG2012 may enhance firm-level TFP through
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technological innovation. We choose the logarithm of R&D expenditure (LnRD), non-green patent
applications (LnNGP), and green patent applications (LnGP) to measure technical innovation
investment, non-green technological innovation, and green technological innovation7, respectively.
As shown in panel A of Table 9, the coefficient of Treat  Post is negative and insignificant in
column (1), while the coefficients of Treat  Post and LnRD are significantly positive in
columns (2) and (3). It shows that technical innovation investment can enhance firm-level TFP,
but the GCG2012 cannot promote firm-level TFP in the treatment group by increasing technical
innovation investment. In panel B of Table 9, the coefficient of Treat  Post is negative and
insignificant in column (1) and the coefficients of LnNGP are negative and insignificant in
columns (2) and (3), indicating that the total factor productivity growth is not caused by non-green
technological innovation after the GCG2012 policy implementation, which is consistent with
Marin (2014). Panel C of Table 9 reports the results of the mediator effect of green technological
innovation, and we can find that the coefficients of Treat  Post and LnGP are significantly
positive, suggesting that green patent applications plays an intermediary role between the
GCG2012 and firm-level TFP in the treatment group. The results in this subsection support
Hypothesis 2.
The GCG2012 cannot exert an incentive effect on enterprises’ innovation. The GCG2012
cannot push companies in green credit restricted industries to increase R&D expenditure because
the GCG2012 may reduce their cash flow, which is the primary source of funding for innovation.
And the GCG2012 has a crowding-out effect on enterprises’ non-green innovation. The purpose of
the GCG2012 is to promote the optimal allocation of financial resources between the
environmental abatement and economic activities. Companies in green credit restricted industries
need to reduce the input of polluting and low-efficiency sectors and increase the input of clean and
high-efficiency sectors, which might help them improve productivity and get loans more easily.
Therefore, in order to ease credit constraints, firms in the treatment group need to allocate more
funds to green technology innovation under the condition of limited technical innovation
investment. And they even may divert funds from non-green technological innovation to green

7

Considering that the distribution of patent applications is right-skewed, we add one to the number of patent

applications and then take the natural logarithm, including non-green patent applications (LnNGP) and green
patent applications (LnGP).
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technological innovation. The technical advance is the basis of the enterprise’s development.
Similarly, more green technological innovation can lead to higher firm-level TFP.
Table 9 The channel analyses through technological innovation.
(1)
Med

(2)
Tfp_lp

(3)
Tfp_op

-0.168
(-0.87)

0.132**
(2.03)
0.037***
(6.98)
0.550
(1.36)
13,977
0.940

0.159**
(2.51)
0.037***
(6.86)
4.220***
(10.93)
13,977
0.898

0.209***
(4.86)
0.006
(1.41)
1.272***
(3.86)
20,415
0.912

0.233***
(5.49)
0.006
(1.27)
4.592***
(13.58)
20,415
0.863

Observations
R-squared

-0.380*
(-1.79)
20,415
0.643

0.209***
(4.85)
0.016**
(1.98)
1.272***
(3.86)
20,415
0.912

0.233***
(5.48)
0.014*
(1.70)
4.592***
(13.58)
20,415
0.863

Controls
Firm FE
Year FE
Industry FE

YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES

Dependent Variable:
Panel A: Technical innovation investment
Treat×Post
LnRD
Constant

3.238***
(3.69)
13,977
0.869

Observations
R-squared

Panel B: Non-green technological innovation
Treat×Post

0.116
(1.60)

LnNGP
Constant

-0.380*
(-1.79)
20,415
0.643

Observations
R-squared
Panel C: Green technological innovation
Treat×Post

0.071**
(2.12)

LnGP
Constant

Notes: Med represents R&D expenditure (LnRD), non-green patent applications (LnNGP) and green patent
applications (LnGP), respectively. The meanings of variables are the same as in Table 2. *, **, and *** represent
the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are clustered at the city-level
level; the numbers in parentheses are t-values.

4.6.2. Agency costs
The GCG2012 can affect the credit constraints of companies in green credit restricted
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industries, and banks act as supervisors for their production processes and financial position,
resulting in lower agency costs (Wang and Wang, 2021). The agency costs are not conducive to
enterprise development (Guan and Lansink, 2006), including productivity (Hossain and
Govindasamy, 2005). The management fee rate embodies the costs caused by agent’s behaviors,
which are mainly caused by the overconsumption of managers, and we use the management fee
rate to measure traditional agency costs (TAC)8 (Ang et al., 2000). Following Zhang et al. (2019b),
we manually collect the environmental expenditure included under “management expense” on a
firm’s annual report and corporate social responsibility report. We then aggregate all
environmental expenditures as environmental management expenses to measure green agency
costs (GAC)9. The GCG2012 has increased the credit costs and financial constraints for companies
in green credit restricted industries (Liu et al., 2017; He et al., 2019), thereby affecting their cash
flow. Faced with insufficient cash flow, managers have to manage the business more diligently.
Shareholders are easier to monitor the production and operation of enterprise activities with the
assistance of the bank’s supervision, which is not conducive for managers to pursue selfish
interests, namely agency cost. This can effectively reduce the agency costs and the savings can be
used to promote enterprise upgrading, for example by increasing TFP.
Table 10 reports the mediator effects of TAC and GAC, respectively. Panel A tests whether the
GCG2012 can boost firm-level TFP in the treatment group through traditional agency costs. The
coefficient of Treat  Post is significantly negative at the 1% level in column (1), indicating
that the GCG2012 significantly reduces traditional agency costs of companies in green credit
restricted industries. The coefficients of TAC are significantly negative at the 1% level in columns
(2) and (3), suggesting that companies with less traditional agency costs in green credit restricted
industries can better promote their TFP. Meanwhile, the coefficients of Treat  Post are
significantly positive at the 1% level in columns (2) and (3), suggesting that traditional agency
costs play an intermediary role between the GCG2012 and firm-level TFP in the treatment group.
Panel B tests whether the GCG2012 can boost firm-level TFP in the treatment group through
green agency costs. Similarly, the coefficient of Treat  Post is significantly negative in

8

𝑇𝐴𝐶 = 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒/𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝐺𝐴𝐶 = 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒/𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒. The sample is missing too much as only a
handful of listed companies have voluntarily disclosed environmental management expenses, including the
afforestation fee, the green fee, and so on.
40
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column (1), while the coefficients of Treat  Post are significantly positive in columns (2) and
(3), suggesting that the GCG2012 can significantly reduce firm-level green agency costs and
enhance firm-level TFP in the treatment group. And the coefficients of GAC are significantly
negative in columns (2) and (3), illustrating that companies in the treatment group can improve
their TFP by reducing the green agency costs. The regression results reported in panel B display
that green agency costs also play an intermediary role between the GCG2012 and firm-level TFP
in the treatment group. And the results of panel A and panel B show that the GCG2012 can better
boost firm-level TFP in the treatment group by reducing the agency costs, including traditional
agency costs and green agency costs, which support our Hypothesis 3.
Table 10 The channel analyses through agency costs.
(1)
Med

(2)
Tfp_lp

(3)
Tfp_op

-0.033***
(-5.60)

0.195***
(4.63)
-0.448***
(-3.06)
1.496***
(4.73)
20,415
0.917

0.218***
(5.27)
-0.475***
(-3.05)
4.831***
(15.13)
20,415
0.872

Observations
R-squared

0.822
(1.38)
2,388
0.641

0.307***
(2.61)
-0.133***
(-2.67)
0.893
(1.20)
2,388
0.945

0.307***
(2.74)
-0.137***
(-2.66)
4.646***
(6.69)
2,388
0.911

Controls
Firm FE
Year FE
Industry FE

YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES

Dependent Variable:
Panel A: Traditional agency costs
Treat×Post
TAC
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.512***
(4.84)
20,415
0.448

Panel B: Green agency costs
Treat×Post

-0.053*
(-1.71)

GAC
Constant

Notes: Med represents traditional agency costs (TAC) and green agency costs (GAC), respectively. The meanings
of variables are the same as in Table 2. *, **, and *** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively; Robust standard errors are clustered at the city-level level; the numbers in parentheses are t-values.
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5. Expand industry definition criteria
The Key Evaluation Indicators for Green Credit Implementation classifies clients into
different categories based on their environmental and social risks (CBRC, 2014). Class A refers to
clients whose construction, production and operating activities take a toll on the environment that
cannot be easily eliminated. Class B refers to clients whose construction, production and operating
activities have negative effects on the environment and society but can be easily eliminated
through mitigation measures. In the previous section, this study demonstrates that the GCG2012
can promote the total factor productivity of clients in Class A. Although the negative
consequences caused by clients in Class B can be more easily eliminated through mitigation
measures than those caused by clients in Class A, clients in Class B with inadequate mitigation
measures to eliminate environmental and social risks are still listed as green credit restricted.
Specifically, 25 industries are defined as Class B, including the pharmaceutical industry, thermal
power generation industry, leather tanning industry, pulp manufacturing industry, and so on.
Thus, we redefine the criteria for green credit restricted industries, including both Class A and
Class B, which is a total of 34 industries. Specifically, if the listed company belongs to these 34
green credit restricted industries, Treati equals one and we choose them as the treatment group;
otherwise, Treati equals zero and we choose them as the control group. Then, we re-estimate
Equation 4 and the results are reported in Table 11. Column (1) of Table 11 provides the result of
the GCG2012 and Tfp_lp, and Column (2) of Table 11 describes the relationship between the
GCG2012 and Tfp_op. We can find that the coefficients of Treat  Post are significantly
positive at the 1% level both in columns (1) and (2). Thus, we can conclude that the GCG2012 has
a noticeable effect not only on the green credit restricted industries in Class A (heavily polluting
industries) but also on the green credit restricted industries in Class B (lightly polluting
industries), which are in line with Wang and Wang (2021). Unlike traditional environmental
policies, the GCG2012 can more effectively promote the firm-level total factor productivity in the
green credit restricted industries, and the result in this subsection further demonstrates the
effectiveness of the GCG2012 policy.
Table 11 The results of expanding the green credit restricted industries.
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Dependent Variable:
Treat×Post
Constant
Controls
Firm FE
Year FE
Industry FE
Observations
R-squared

(1)
Tfp_lp

(2)
Tfp_op

0.070***
(4.12)
1.270***
(3.88)
YES
YES
YES
YES
20,415
0.912

0.072***
(4.17)
4.593***
(13.67)
YES
YES
YES
YES
20,415
0.863

Notes: This table shows the results of expanding the green credit restricted industries to include Class A and Class
B. The interaction term (Treat×Post) is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm belongs to the green credit
restriction industries in 2012 and beyond. The meanings of variables are the same as in Table 2. *, **, and ***
represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are clustered at the citylevel level; the numbers in parentheses are t-values.

6. Further study: economic efficiency of the GCG2012
This study demonstrates that the GCG2012 can promote the total factor productivity of
companies in green credit restricted industries by pushing them to increase green innovation and
reduce agency costs. Liu et al. (2014) indicate that economic incentive instruments can
significantly increase the economic performance of firms. So does the GCG2012 affect firm-level
economic performance by boosting total factor productivity? We further test the economic
efficiency of the GCG2012 through TFP using the mediating effect method, and construct the
following models:

ROSijt = 0 +1Treati  Postt +3 X it + γt + δi + εijt

(9)

ROSijt = 0 + 1Treati  Postt + 2TFPijt  3 X it + γt + δi + εijt

(10)

where ROSijt represents the return on sales10 and is used to measure the economic performance
of the company. The meanings of other variables are the same as in Equation 4. In this subsection,
Equation 9 tests whether the GCG2012 can directly affect the economic performance of
companies in green credit restricted industries, and Equation 10 tests whether the GCG2012 can

10

𝑅𝑂𝑆 = 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡/𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒
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affect their economic performance through total factor productivity.
Column (1) of Table 12 reports the regression results of Equation 9. We can find that the
coefficient of Treat  Post is significantly positive at the 5% level, indicating that the
GCG2012 can improve the economic performance of companies in green credit restricted
industries. And the coefficients of Treat  Post and TFP are also significantly positive in
columns (2) and (3), showing that firm-level TFP plays an intermediary role between the
GCG2012 and the economic performance of companies in the treatment group. The regression
results reported in Table 12 show that the GCG2012 has achieved desirable results. In the long run,
the GCG2012 not only prods companies in green credit restricted industries to green development
but also achieves a win-win for both the environment and the economy, as evidenced by Wang and
Wang (2021). The conclusion is consistent with our previous analysis and Hypothesis 4 is tenable.
Table 12 Economic efficiency of the GCG2012 through TFP.
Dependent Variable:
Treat×Post

(1)
ROS

(2)
ROS

(3)
ROS

0.083**
(2.12)

0.072*
(1.82)
0.055*
(1.82)

0.067*
(1.67)

Tfp_lp
Tfp_op
Constant
Controls
Firm FE
Year FE
Observations
R-squared

-0.429
(-1.36)
YES
YES
YES
20,416
0.348

-0.498
(-1.50)
YES
YES
YES
20,416
0.349

0.072**
(2.25)
-0.757*
(-1.93)
YES
YES
YES
20,416
0.349

Notes: ROS represents the firm-level return on sales. The meanings of variables are the same as in Table 2. *, **,
and *** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust standard errors are clustered at
the city-level level; the numbers in parentheses are t-values.

7. Conclusions and implications
China’s economy is undertaking the transition from high growth to high-quality development.
Improving total factor productivity is the driving force to improve the quality of economic
development and maintain high economic growth. To help realize green, low-carbon and high44
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quality development, the Chinese government introduces green finance to incentivize and attract
resources to tilt towards low-carbon green projects aimed at achieving the dual carbon goals.
Unlike traditional environmental regulation, green credit can play a role in environmental
governance from the initial stages of the production process and act throughout the whole
production process, because of its ability to allocate funds. So, is there a contradiction between
strengthening environmental management and improving the quality of economic development?
The answer is no. This study uses the difference-in-differences method to control potential
endogeneity problems, and examines the impact of the Green Credit Guidelines in 2012
(GCG2012) on the firm-level total factor productivity. We first test the effectiveness of the
GCG2012 policy, that is, whether it has effects on firm-level liabilities in green credit restricted
industries. We find that the GCG2012 policy can reduce firm-level long-term debt in the treatment
group. Our results then show that the GCG2012 has a significant positive impact on the total
factor productivity of listed companies in green credit restricted industries by employing DID
model and DDD model. We employ the PSM-DID model, build a multiple fixed-effect model,
replace the polluting industries, extend the sample period, exclude delisted companies and
companies listed after 2012, and eliminate the effects of financial crises, and our conclusions
remain robust. Mechanism tests show that the GCGC2012 can boost the firm-level TFP in the
treatment group by increasing their green technology innovation and reducing their agency costs,
including traditional agency costs and green agency costs. And the GCG2012 has a crowding-out
effect on enterprises’ non-green innovation. In addition, the GCG2012 policy can both boost the
TFP of SOEs and non-SOEs, and has a greater influence on non-SOEs, implying that the
GCG2012 is stricter for non-SOEs. Companies in green credit restricted industries with worse
debt-paying ability are more sensitive to the GCG2012 policy. The GCG2012 policy only prods
companies in highly competitive industries to improve their TFP, but has no effect on companies
in less competitive industries. And regions with higher financial liberalization are more sensitive
to the GCG2012 policy. Our further analyses suggest that the GCG2012 can improve the
economic performance of firms in green credit-constrained industries by increasing their total
factor productivity and the GCG2012 is effective not only for heavy polluting industries, but also
for less polluting industries. Based on the above findings, we provide the following
recommendations.
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Firstly, in order to further promote high-quality economic development, banking institutions
should adequately adjust the allocations of credit resources to alleviate the problem of
environmental pollution in China. Our empirical results demonstrate that the GCG2012 policy
effectively promotes the firm-level TFP in green credit restricted industries and achieves a winwin situation for the economic and environmental performance. Green finance in China does
achieve the long-term goal of advancing green development, which generates the Porter effect in
the current system. Financial institutions should achieve synergetic development of the breadth
and depth of the green financial system by accelerating innovation and boosting service efficiency
of green financial instruments, such as green bonds, green insurance, green funds and so on. Then,
the green credit policy can better prod companies in green credit restricted industries to upgrade
and switch to the green economy through the multiplex development of the green financial system.
In addition, banks should combine the specific characteristics of each industry to propose targeted
green credit standards and risk management requirements. They also should provide specifically
green credit products and services for each region with the different levels of financial
liberalization.
Secondly, companies should strengthen corporate governance, especially green governance
and promote green innovation to reduce credit constraints. Companies should fully mobilize
stakeholders to monitor corporate environmental decisions and take full advantage of the bank’s
monitoring function. Shareholders should both prevent managers from overspending on
environmental expenses for their own ends and urge managers to allocate research and
development expenditures appropriately. Companies in green credit restricted industries can
promote their total factor productivity by alleviating agency problems and enhancing green
innovation to achieve sustainable development and reduce their own financing constraints.

Appendix A
Table A1 Parallel trend assumption of the GCG2012 policy and TFP.
Dependent Variable:
Treat×Post2007
Treat×Post2008

(1)
Tfp_lp

(2)
Tfp_op

-0.030
(-0.47)
-0.077

-0.057
(-0.91)
-0.105
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(-1.06)
-0.050
(-1.00)
0.032
(0.77)
0.173***
(3.91)
0.171***
(3.52)
0.145**
(2.36)
0.138**
(2.15)
0.188*
(1.81)
0.353***
(3.55)
0.415***
(3.92)
0.364***
(3.05)
1.255***
(3.80)
YES
YES
YES
YES
20,415
0.912

Treat×Post2009
Treat×Post2010
Treat×Post2012
Treat×Post2013
Treat×Post2014
Treat×Post2015
Treat×Post2016
Treat×Post2017
Treat×Post2018
Treat×Post2019
Constant
Controls
Firm FE
Year FE
Industry FE
Observations
R-squared

(-1.50)
-0.063
(-1.33)
0.012
(0.32)
0.173***
(3.97)
0.180***
(3.77)
0.153**
(2.56)
0.150**
(2.43)
0.207**
(2.18)
0.355***
(3.89)
0.400***
(4.31)
0.380***
(3.30)
4.577***
(13.52)
YES
YES
YES
YES
20,415
0.863

Notes: This table addresses the parallel trend assumption of the GCG2012 policy and TFP based on the event
study approach. We select 2011 as the base year, so Treat×Post2011 is excluded. The meanings of variables are the
same as in Table 2. *, **, and *** represent the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; Robust
standard errors are clustered at the city-level level. The numbers in parentheses are t-values.
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a.

b.

Fig.A1. The placebo test of the GCG2012 policy and TFP repeat 500 times. Notes: Fig. A1a and b report the
results of Tfp_lp and Tfp_op, respectively. The x-axis represents estimated coefficients. The curve represents the
kernel density and the points represent p-values of 500 estimates of Treat×Post randomly. The vertical line is the
estimate of TFP in columns (4) and (6) of Table 2.

References
Aghion, P., Dechezleprêtre, A., Hemous, D., Martin, R., & Van Reenen, J. (2016). Carbon taxes,
path dependency, and directed technical change: Evidence from the auto industry. Journal of
Political Economy, 124(1), 1-51.
Aizawa, M., & Yang, C. (2010). Green credit, green stimulus, green revolution? China’s
mobilization of banks for environmental cleanup. Journal of Environment & Development,
19(2), 119-144.
Allen, F., Qian, J., & Qian, M. (2005). Law, finance, and economic growth in China. Journal of
Financial Economics, 77(1), 57-116.
Alpay, E., Kerkvliet, J., & Buccola, S. (2002). Productivity growth and environmental regulation
in Mexican and US food manufacturing. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 84(4),
887-901.
An, S., Li, B., Song, D., & Chen, X. (2021). Green credit financing versus trade credit financing in
a supply chain with carbon emission limits. European Journal of Operational Research,
292(1), 125-142.
Ang, J. S., Cole, R. A., & Lin, J. W. (2000). Agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of
Finance, 55(1), 81-106.
Baier, S. L., Dwyer Jr, G. P., & Tamura, R. (2006). How important are capital and total factor
productivity for economic growth?. Economic Inquiry, 44(1), 23-49.
Bansal, P., & Hunter, T. (2003). Strategic explanations for the early adoption of ISO 14001.
Journal of Business Ethics, 46(3), 289-299.
Barbera, A. J., & McConnell, V. D. (1990). The impact of environmental regulations on industry
productivity: direct and indirect effects. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 18(1), 50-65.
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social
48

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1368

50

Guo and Zhang: Green credit policy and total factor productivity: Evidence

psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of
personality and social psychology, 51(6), 1173.
Becker, R. A. (2011). Local environmental regulation and plant-level productivity. Ecological
Economics, 70(12), 2516-2522.
Brandt, L., Van Biesebroeck, J., & Zhang, Y. (2012). Creative accounting or creative destruction?
Firm-level productivity growth in Chinese manufacturing. Journal of Development
Economics, 97(2), 339-351.
Borghesi, S., Cainelli, G., & Mazzanti, M. (2015). Linking emission trading to environmental
innovation: evidence from the Italian manufacturing industry. Research Policy, 44(3), 669683.
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data
models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115-143.
Caggese, A., & Cuñat, V. (2013). Financing constraints, firm dynamics, export decisions, and
aggregate productivity. Review of Economic Dynamics, 16(1), 177-193.
Cai, X., Lu, Y., Wu, M., & Yu, L. (2016). Does environmental regulation drive away inbound
foreign direct investment? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China. Journal of
Development Economics, 123, 73-85.
Chen, Y. S. (2008). The driver of green innovation and green image - green core competence.
Journal of Business Ethics, 81(3), 531-543.
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) (2012). Notice on printing and issuing Green
Credit Guidelines. http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2012/content_2163593.htm.
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) (2014). Notice on Key Evaluation Indicators for
Green Credit Implementation.gov.cn:4601/law?fn=chl401s691.txt.
Christmann, P. (2000). Effects of “best practices” of environmental management on cost
advantage: The role of complementary assets. Academy of Management Journal, 43(4), 663680.
Coibion, O., Gorodnichenko, Y., Kumar, S. (2018). How do firms form their expectations? new
survey evidence. American Economic Review, 108(9), 2671-2713.
Cornett, M. M., Marcus, A. J., Saunders, A., & Tehranian, H. (2007). The impact of institutional
ownership on corporate operating performance. Journal of Banking & Finance, 31(6), 177149

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

51

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1368 [2022]

1794.
Demir, F., Hu, C., Liu, J., & Shen, H. (2022). Local corruption, total factor productivity and firm
heterogeneity: Empirical evidence from Chinese manufacturing firms. World Development,
151, 105770.
Diamond, D. W. (1984). Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. Review of Economic
Studies, 51(3), 393-414.
Ding, J. (2019). Green Credit Policy, Credit Resources Allocation and Strategic Response of
Enterprises. Economic Review, 04, 62-75.
Ding, S., & Knight, J. (2011). Why has China grown so fast? The role of physical and human
capital formation. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 73(2), 141-174.
Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. E. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts,
evidence, and implications. Academy of Management Review, 20(1), 65-91.
Durnev, A., & Kim, E. H. (2005). To steal or not to steal: Firm attributes, legal environment, and
valuation. Journal of Finance, 60(3), 1461-1493.
Duygan-Bump, B., Levkov, A., & Montoriol-Garriga, J. (2015). Financing constraints and
unemployment: Evidence from the Great Recession. Journal of Monetary Economics, 75, 89105.
Evangelinos, K. I., & Nikolaou, I. E. (2009). Environmental accounting and the banking sector: a
framework for measuring environmental-financial risks. International Journal of Services
Sciences, 2(3-4), 366-380.
Goetz, M. R. (2019). Financing conditions and toxic emissions, SAFE Working Paper.
Gray, W. B., & Shadbegian, R. J. (2003). Plant vintage, technology, and environmental regulation.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 46(3), 384-402.
Guan, Z.F., & Lansink, A. O. (2006). The source of productivity growth in Dutch agriculture: a
perspective from finance. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 88(3), 644-656.
Hamamoto, M. (2006). Environmental regulation and the productivity of Japanese manufacturing
industries. Resource and Energy Economics, 28(4), 299-312.
He, L., Zhang, L., Zhong, Z., Wang, D., & Wang, F. (2019). Green credit, renewable energy
investment and green economy development: Empirical analysis based on 150 listed
companies of China. Journal of Cleaner Production, 208, 363-372.
50

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1368

52

Guo and Zhang: Green credit policy and total factor productivity: Evidence

Henriques, I., & Sadorsky, P. (1999). The relationship between environmental commitment and
managerial perceptions of stakeholder importance. Academy of Management Journal, 42(1),
87-99.
Herzer, D. (2022). The impact of domestic and foreign R&D on TFP in developing countries.
World Development, 151, 105754.
Hossain, F., Jain, R., & Govindasamy, R. (2005). Financial structure, production, and productivity:
evidence from the US food manufacturing industry. Agricultural Economics, 33, 399-410.
Hu, G., Wang, X., & Wang, Y. (2021). Can the green credit policy stimulate green innovation in
heavily polluting enterprises? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China. Energy
Economics, 98, 105134.
Huang, J., Cai, X., Huang, S., Tian, S., & Lei, H. (2019). Technological factors and total factor
productivity in China: Evidence based on a panel threshold model. China Economic Review,
54, 271-285.
Jacobson, L. S., LaLonde, R. J., & Sullivan, D. G. (1993). Earnings losses of displaced workers.
American Economic Review, 685-709.
Jefferson, G. H., Rawski, T. G., & Zhang, Y. (2008). Productivity growth and convergence across
China's industrial economy. Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 6(2), 121140.
Jefferson, G. H., & Su, J. (2006). Privatization and restructuring in China: Evidence from
shareholding ownership, 1995–2001. Journal of Comparative Economics, 34(1), 146-166.
Jorgenson, D. W., & Wilcoxen, P. J. (1990). Environmental regulation and US economic growth.
Rand Journal of Economics, 314-340.
Kadoshin, S., Nishiyama, T., & Ito, T. (2000). The trend in current and near future energy
consumption from a statistical perspective. Applied Energy, 67(4), 407-417.
Kitsikopoulos, C., Schwaibold, U., & Taylor, D. (2018). Limited progress in sustainable
development: Factors influencing the environmental management and reporting of South
African JSE‐listed companies. Business Strategy and the Environment, 27(8), 1295-1301.
Lanoie, P., Patry, M., & Lajeunesse, R. (2008). Environmental regulation and productivity: testing
the porter hypothesis. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 30(2), 121-128.
Levinsohn, J., & Petrin, A. (2003). Estimating production functions using inputs to control for
51

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

53

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1368 [2022]

unobservables. Review of Economic Studies, 70(2), 317-341.
Li, Z., Liao, G., Wang, Z., & Huang, Z. (2018). Green Loan and Subsidy for Promoting Clean
Production Innovation. Journal of Cleaner Production, 187, 421-431.
Lin, J. Y., Cai, F., & Li, Z. (1998). Competition, policy burdens, and state-owned enterprise reform.
American Economic Review, 88(2), 422-427.
Lin, Y.F., Liu, M.X., & Zhang, Q. (2004). Policy burden and soft budget constraints of firms: An
empirical study from China. Management World, 03, 81-89+127-156.
Liu, J. Y., Xia, Y., Fan, Y., Lin, S. M., & Wu, J. (2017). Assessment of a green credit policy aimed
at energy-intensive industries in China based on a financial CGE model. Journal of Cleaner
Production, 163, 293-302.
Liu, M., Tan, R., & Zhang, B. (2021). The costs of “blue sky”: environmental regulation,
technology upgrading, and labor demand in China. Journal of Development Economics, 150,
102610.
Liu, X. (2016). Corruption culture and corporate misconduct. Journal of Financial Economics,
122(2), 307-327.
Liu, X., Wang, E., & Cai, D. (2019). Green credit policy, property rights and debt financing:
Quasi-natural experimental evidence from China. Finance Research Letters, 29, 129-135.
Liu, X.L., & Wen, S.Y. (2019). Should financial institutions be environmentally responsible in
China? Facts, theory and evidence. Economic Research Journal, 03, 38-54.
Liu, Z., Mao, X., Tu, J., & Jaccard, M. (2014). A comparative assessment of economic-incentive
and command-and-control instruments for air pollution and CO2 control in China's iron and
steel sector. Journal of Environmental Management, 144, 135-142.
Liu, Z., & Xin, L. (2019). Has China’s Belt and Road Initiative promoted its green total factor
productivity?--evidence from primary provinces along the route. Energy Policy, 129, 360-369.
Lu, J., Yan, Y., & Wang, T.X. (2021). The microeconomic effects of green credit policy--From the
perspective of technological innovation and resource reallocation. China Industrial
Economics, 01, 174-192.
Lu, X.D., & Lian, Y.J. (2012). Estimation of total factor productivity of industrial enterprises in
China: 1999-2007. China Economic Quarterly, 11(2), 541-558.
Luo, C., Fan, S., & Zhang, Q. (2017). Investigating the influence of green credit on operational
52

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1368

54

Guo and Zhang: Green credit policy and total factor productivity: Evidence

efficiency and financial performance based on hybrid econometric models. International
Journal of Financial Studies, 5(4), 27.
Ma, Y., & Lin, X. (2016). Financial development and the effectiveness of monetary policy.
Journal of Banking & Finance, 68, 1-11.
Marin, G. (2014). Do eco-innovations harm productivity growth through crowding out? Results of
an extended CDM model for Italy. Research Policy, 43(2), 301-317.
Melville, N., Gurbaxani, V., Kraemer, K. (2007). The productivity impact of information
technology across competitive regimes: The role of industry concentration and dynamism.
Decision Support Systems, 43(1), 229-242.
Miao, J., & Wang, P. (2012). Bubbles and total factor productivity. American Economic Review,
102(3), 82-87.
Nickell, S. J. (1996). Competition and corporate performance. Journal of Political Economy,
104(4), 724-746.
Olley, G.S., & Pakes, A., 1996. The dynamics of productivity in the telecommunications
equipment industry. Econometrica, 64(6), 1263–1297.
Peng, J., Xie, R., Ma, C., & Fu, Y. (2021). Market-based environmental regulation and total factor
productivity: Evidence from Chinese enterprises. Economic Modelling, 95, 394-407.
Petitjean, M. (2019). Eco-friendly policies and financial performance: Was the financial crisis a
game changer for large US companies?. Energy Economics, 80, 502-511.
Porter, M. E., & van der Linde, C. (1995). Toward a new conception of the environmentcompetitiveness relationship. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4), 97-118.
Ren, S.G., Zheng, J.J., & Chen, X.H. (2019). Does emission trading system improve firm’s total
factor productivity—Evidence from Chinese listed companies. China Industrial Economics,
05, 5-23.
Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1983). The central role of the propensity score in observational
studies for causal effects. Biometrika, 70(1), 41-55.
Rubashkina, Y., Galeotti, M., & Verdolini, E. (2015). Environmental regulation and
competitiveness: Empirical evidence on the Porter Hypothesis from European manufacturing
sectors. Energy Policy, 83, 288-300.
Scholtens, B., & Dam, L. (2007). Banking on the equator. Are banks that adopted the equator
53

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

55

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1368 [2022]

principles different from non-adopters?. World Development, 35(8), 1307-1328.
Shapiro, J. S., & Walker, R. (2018). Why is pollution from US manufacturing declining? The roles
of environmental regulation, productivity, and trade. American Economic Review, 108(12),
3814-54.
Sharma, S., & Henriques, I. (2005). Stakeholder influences on sustainability practices in the
Canadian forest products industry. Strategic Management Journal, 26(2), 159-180.
Soundarrajan, P., & Vivek, N. (2016). Green finance for sustainable green economic growth in
India. Agricultural Economics, 62(1), 35-44.
State Environmental Protection Administration of China (SEPA) (2010). Environmental
Information Disclosure Guidelines for Listed Companies (Draft for Soliciting Opinions).
http://www.ccen.info/fagui/2017/0208/5020.html.
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981). Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information.
American Economic Review, 71(3), 393-410.
Sun, J., Wang, F., Yin, H., & Zhang, B. (2019). Money Talks: The Environmental impact of
China’s green credit policy. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 38(3), 653-680.
Testa, F., Iraldo, F., & Frey, M. (2011). The effect of environmental regulation on firms’
competitive performance: The case of the building & construction sector in some EU regions.
Journal of Environmental Management, 92(9), 2136-2144.
The Executive Meeting of the State Council (EMSC) (2017). China will build pilot zone for green
financial

reform

and

innovation.

http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2017-

06/14/content_5202609.htm.
The People’s Bank of China and seven other departments (PBC), Ministry of Finance, State
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Environmental Protection, China
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC),
China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC). (2016). Guidance on building a green
financial system. https://www.mee.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/gwy/201611/t20161124_368163.htm.
The World Bank (2007). Cost of Pollution In China: Economic Estimates Of Physical Damages.
Washington, D.C.
Van Beveren, I. (2012). Total factor productivity estimation: A practical review. Journal of
Economic Surveys, 26(1), 98-128.
54

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1368

56

Guo and Zhang: Green credit policy and total factor productivity: Evidence

Viscusi, W. K. (1983). Frameworks for analyzing the effects of risk and environmental regulations
on productivity. American Economic Review, 73(4), 793-801.
Wang, G.J., & Lu, X.X. (2019). The belt and road initiative and the upgrading of China’s
enterprises. China Industrial Economics, 03, 43-61.
Wang, J., & Liu, B. (2014). Environmental regulation and enterprises’ TFP -- An empirical
analysis based on China’s industrial enterprise data. China Industrial Economics, 03, 44-56.
Wang, X., & Wang, Y. (2021). Research on the green innovation promoted by green credit policies.
Journal of Management World, 37(06):173-188.
Wang, X.H., Liu, J.H., & Zhao, Y.X. (2021). Effectiveness measurement of green finance reform
and innovation Pilot Zone. Journal of Quantitative & Technical Economics, 38(10):107-127.
Wang, X.L., Fan, G., & Hu, L.P. (2019). Index of marketization of China’s provinces (2018).
Social Sciences Academic Press (China).
Wang, Y., Lei, X., Long, R., & Zhao, J. (2020). Green credit, financial constraint, and capital
investment: evidence from China’s energy-intensive enterprises. Environmental Management,
66(6), 1059-1071.
Wen, H., Lee, C.C., & Zhou, F. (2021). Green credit policy, credit allocation efficiency and
upgrade of energy-intensive enterprises. Energy Economics, 94, 105099.
Wen, H., & Zhao, Z. (2021). How does China’s industrial policy affect firms’ R&D investment?
Evidence from ‘Made in China 2025’. Applied Economics, 53(55), 6333-6347.
Wen, Z.L., Zhang, L., Hou, J.T., & Liu, H.Y. (2004). Testing and application of the mediating
effects. Acta Psychologica Sinica, 06, 614-620.
Xu, X., & Li, J. (2020). Asymmetric impacts of the policy and development of green credit on the
debt financing cost and maturity of different types of enterprises in China. Journal of Cleaner
Production, 264, 121574.
Yao, S., Pan, Y., Sensoy, A., Uddin, G. S., & Cheng, F. (2021). Green credit policy and firm
performance: What we learn from China. Energy Economics, 101, 105415.
Yu, C. H., Wu, X., Zhang, D., Chen, S., & Zhao, J. (2021). Demand for green finance: Resolving
financing constraints on green innovation in China. Energy Policy, 153, 112255.
Zhang, Z.X. (2000). Decoupling China’s carbon emissions increases from economic growth: an
economic analysis and policy implications. World Development, 28(4), 739–52.
55

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

57

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1368 [2022]

Zhang, Z.X. (2017). Are China’s climate commitments in a post-Paris agreement sufficiently
ambitious?. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 8(2), e443.
Zhang, Z.X. (2021). Climate policy towards carbon neutrality in China. In Francesco Caselli,
Alexander Ludwig and Rick van der Ploeg (eds.), No Brainers and Low Hanging Fruits in
National Climate Policy, CEPR E-Book, London, pp. 57-67.
Zhang, B., & Wang, Y. (2021). The effect of green finance on energy sustainable development: a
case study in China. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 57(12), 3435-3454.
Zhang, B., Yang, Y., & Bi, J. (2011a). Tracking the implementation of green credit policy in China:
Top-down perspective and bottom-up reform. Journal of Environmental Management, 92(4),
1321-1327.
Zhang, C., Lu, Y., Guo, L., & Yu, T.S. (2011b). The intensity of environmental regulation and
technological progress of production. Economic Research Journal, 02,113-124.
Zhang, G., Fang, C., Zhang, W., Wang, Q., & Hu, D. (2019a). How does the implementation of the
new Environmental Protection Law affect the stock price of heavily polluting enterprises?
Evidence from China’s capital market. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 55(15), 35133538.
Zhang, K., Li, Y., Qi, Y., & Shao, S. (2021a). Can green credit policy improve environmental
quality? Evidence from China. Journal of Environmental Management, 298, 113445.
Zhang, Q., Yu, Z., & Kong, D. (2019b). The real effect of legal institutions: Environmental courts
and firm environmental protection expenditure. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 98, 102254.
Zhang, S., Wu, Z., Wang, Y., & Hao, Y. (2021b). Fostering green development with green finance:
An empirical study on the environmental effect of green credit policy in China. Journal of
Environmental Management, 296, 113159.

56

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1368

58

Guo and Zhang: Green credit policy and total factor productivity: Evidence

FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI WORKING PAPER SERIES
“NOTE DI LAVORO”
Our Working Papers are available on the Internet at the following address:
http://www.feem.it/getpage.aspx?id=73&sez=Publications&padre=20&tab=1
“NOTE DI LAVORO” PUBLISHED IN 2022

1. 2022, Daniele Crotti, Elena Maggi, Evangelia Pantelaki, Urban cycling tourism. How can bikes and
public transport ride together for sustainability?
2. 2022, Antonio Acconcia, Sergio Beraldo, Carlo Capuano, Marco Stimolo, Public subsidies and
cooperation in research and development. Evidence from the lab
3. 2022, Jia Meng, ZhongXiang Zhang, Corporate Environmental Information Disclosure and Investor
Response: Empirical Evidence from China's Capital Market
4. 2022, Mariagrazia D'Angeli, Giovanni Marin, Elena Paglialunga, Climate Change, Armed Conflicts and
Resilience
5. 2022, Davide Antonioli, Claudia Ghisetti, Massimiliano Mazzanti, Francesco Nicolli, The economic
returns of circular economy practices
6. 2022, Massimiliano Mazzanti, Francesco Nicolli, Stefano Pareglio, Marco Quatrosi, Adoption of Eco
and Circular Economy-Innovation in Italy: exploring different firm profiles
7. 2022, Davide Antonioli, Claudia Ghisetti, Stefano Pareglio, Marco Quatrosi, Innovation, Circular
economy practices and organisational settings: empirical evidence from Italy
8. 2022, Ilenia Romani, Marzio Galeotti, Alessandro Lanza, Besides promising economic growth, will the
Italian NRRP also produce fewer emissions?
9. 2022, Emanuele Ciola, Enrico Turco, Andrea Gurgone, Davide Bazzana, Sergio Vergalli, Francesco
Menoncin, Charging the macroeconomy with an energy sector: an agent-based model
10. 2022, Emanuele Millemaci, Alessandra Patti, Nemo propheta in Patria: Empirical Evidence from Italy
11. 2022, Daniele Valenti, Andrea Bastianin, Matteo Manera, A weekly structural VAR model of the US
crude oil market
12. 2022, Banchongsan Charoensook, On Efficiency and Stability in Two-way Flow Network with Small
Decay: A Note
13. 2022, Shu Guo, ZhongXiang Zhang, Green credit policy and total factor productivity: Evidence from
Chinese listed companies

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

59

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1368 [2022]

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Corso Magenta 63, Milano – Italia
Tel. +39 02 403 36934
E-mail: letter@feem.it
www.feem.it

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1368

60

